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ABSTRACT 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists used commercial airliners as weapons of terror 
inside the United States, and America’s approach to security was forever changed.  While 
commercial airliners were the weapons of choice on that day, the 9/11 Commission 
recognized that Al Qaeda and other groups had, prior to the use of airlines, used suicide 
vehicles, namely, truck bombs, to commit terrorist acts.   
The threat from hazmat trucks continues today.  There can be no doubt that 
terrorists are interested in using hazmat trucks as weapons within the borders of the 
United States.  In 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Iraq was 
punctuated by a fuel-truck attack that burned a section of Baghdad.  More recently, 
terrorists in Iraq have used chlorine-based truck bombs repeatedly as a weapon in the Iraq 
war.   
The Department of Transportation (DOT) recognizes that hazmat trucks are 
“dangerous and ready-made weapons” and are “especially attractive” to terrorists.  
Stephen Gale, a University of Pennsylvania professor and terrorism expert, agrees that 
hazmat trucks are essentially ready-made bombs that are “tailor-made” for terrorists to 
conduct an attack at the lowest cost and with the greatest impact.  In fact, terrorism 
experts consider trucks to be one of the best tools a terrorist can use to breach security 
measures and carry explosives since the U.S. airline industry significantly increased 
security procedures. 
The ability of the government to secure every hazardous materials motor carrier 
against terrorist attack is severely limited, yet the potential that hazardous materials 
trucks will be used in terrorist attacks is great.  Therefore, it is important to consider 
whether the security of hazardous materials motor carriers can be improved voluntarily 
and quickly by realigning existing resources and instituting a plan that leverages market 




This thesis introduces a unique voluntary incentive-based program, Security 
Through Assessed Risk (STAR) that can be used to increase security for a vast number of 
presently under protected hazardous materials motor carriers.  It explains how TSA can 
leverage existing resources as well as successful ideas from both private sector and 
governmental programs to rapidly and significantly enhance the security of hazardous 
materials motor carriers.   
 vii
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A. IDENTIFY PROBLEM 
It’s 9:15 am on black Friday, 2009.  Shoppers have been lined up at the malls 
since 7:30 am to take advantage of the special offers the retailers have advertised as 
incentives to encourage a full day of shopping.  The malls are crowded and the holiday 
season has been festive. 
It’s 9:15 am on black Friday, 2009.  Bud Wilson pulls his fuel tanker into a Shell 
station to make his first delivery for the day.  He parks his truck near the fuel tanks and 
gets out to meet with the station manager to get his manifest signed. 
It’s 9:15 am on black Friday, 2009.  Adham has been waiting by the pay phone 
for Bud to arrive.  Bud always delivers on Friday and always on time.  Adham quietly 
walks over to the unattended fuel truck, hops in the driver’s seat, and proceeds to drive 
off.   
Bud sees his truck is moving and begins to run towards it.  By the time he gets to 
where the truck was, it is already too late.  The truck is well on its way down the road.  
Bud quickly runs back to the station manager and tells him to call the police.  The station 
manager calls 9-1-1 and Bud reports the theft.  Bud is distraught and is not sure what to 
do next so he calls his supervisor. 
While Bud was making calls, Adham completes his short trip to the mall and 
stops the truck outside the floor to ceiling glass walls of the mall’s food court.  The food 
court is crowded because the early shoppers have decided to stop for a break and newly 
arriving shoppers are eating breakfast.  It is a good day for Adham, his plan has worked 
well.  He has trained well and waited a long time for this day, the day he becomes a 
martyr.  He reaches for the trigger to the suicide vest he is wearing and flips the switch.  
Adham knows that he will soon be joining the four other terrorist cell members who 
repeated the same plan in coordinated attacks in four other major American cities. 
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Almost a month later, on Christmas day, children all over America are met by 
scarce gifts under their trees because their parents were too afraid to go shopping.  
Retailers all across the country are reeling from their worst holiday season ever, and 
some are considering filing for bankruptcy.  Even worse is the number of families who 
are suffering from the effects of the layoffs at the malls.  Bills go unpaid, foreclosures are 
on the rise yet again, and the American government can place blame on no country.  
These events occurred not because of a lack of imagination; the government knew of the 
threat.  These events occurred because the American government failed to act.  
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II. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY  
A. AVIATION SECURITY 
On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked when a radical Islamic 
terrorist organization, Al Qaeda, sent nineteen followers on a suicide mission to hijack 
four domestic U.S. airplanes and crash them into the World Trade Towers in New York 
City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.1  These buildings represented American 
culture and values and were recognized around the world.  For purposes of this thesis, it 
is not as important to understand Al Qaeda as it is to understand the tactics it used to 
carry out its attack and America’s lack of preparation for such an attack.   
When the dust had settled, the United States Congress and President George W. 
Bush created the National Commission on Terrorist Acts Upon the United States 
commonly known as the 9/11 Commission.  This Commission was given the mandate to 
investigate “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.”2  As a result of its investigation, the Commission found that one of the main 
reasons they believed that terrorists were able to use commercial aircraft as weapons 
against the United States was due to a failure of imagination.3  The report elaborated 
further that “imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies.”4   
If the events of 9/11 occurred in part due to a lack of imagination, because 
nothing of the sort had ever happened in the past, then once America had knowledge that 
terrorists would use airplanes in terror attacks, it becomes incumbent upon America to act 
so that similar events can never happen again.  In response to these terror attacks, the 
President created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and specifically, the 
                                                 
1 A fourth airplane did not make it to its intended target (to date still unknown) as the hijackers were 
overpowered by the passengers and the plane crashed into a filed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. 
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, preface to The 9/11 Commission 
Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), xv. 
3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 339. 
4 Ibid., 344. 
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  The Transportation Security 
Administration’s stated mission is to protect the nation’s transportation systems to ensure 
freedom of movement for people and commerce.5  As a result, numerous new initiatives 
have been developed to protect commercial airline passengers including federalization 
and enhancement of the passenger and cargo screening processes as well as the 
development of enhanced aircraft security regulations.6   
B. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS MOTOR CARRIER SECURITY 
1. Context 
TSA’s challenge is to imagine, assess, and mitigate all possible terrorist threat 
scenarios that may occur through the use of transportation vehicles or methods.  One 
obvious threat involves using trucks hauling hazardous materials (hazmat) as a weapon.  
The 9/11 Commission recognized that Al Qaeda and other groups had, prior to the use of 
airlines, used suicide vehicles, namely, truck bombs, to commit terrorist acts.7  In fact, in 
the period from April 1983 to December 2007, terrorist groups have used commercial 
motor vehicles, including buses and hazmat trucks, more than 180 times as weapons of 
terror both internationally and domestically.8  For example, the following events all 
occurred in a two-month period in 2002. 
• March 31, 2002: A 29-year-old driver for a propane distributor drove 
away with a 3000 gallon bobtail.  He made a telephone threat stating that 
he wanted to kill President George W. Bush and that he would use the 
bobtail as a bomb. 
• April 11, 2002: A terrorist driving a truck carrying liquefied natural gas 
ignited his cargo in front of a synagogue on the Tunisian Island of Djerba, 
killing 17 people, mainly German and French tourists.  Al Qaeda claimed 
responsibility for the blast. 
                                                 
5 Transportation Security Administration Mission Statement, 
http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/mission.shtm (accessed December 11, 2008). 
6 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 STAT. 597 (2001). 
7 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9/11 Commission Report, 344. 
8 Anonymous government source. 
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• May 16, 2002: A tractor-trailer carrying 10 tons of deadly cyanide in 96 
drums was stolen after three armed men held up the vehicle north of 
Mexico City.  Six drums were never found. 
• May 2002: A fully loaded tanker truck pulled into Israel’s largest fuel 
depot and suddenly caught fire due to an explosive charge connected to a 
cellular phone.  The fire was extinguished, but had the truck exploded, 
destruction and death would have resulted.9   
The threat from hazmat trucks continues today.  In 2004, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Iraq was punctuated by a fuel-truck attack that burned a 
section of Baghdad.10  More recently, terrorists in Iraq have used chlorine-based truck 
bombs repeatedly as a weapon in the Iraq war.  For example, in the first three months of 
2007, nine attacks using hazmat trucks were attempted and seven were successful. 
• January 28, 2007: Sixteen people were killed in a chlorine truck explosion 
in Ramadi. 
• February 19, 2007: A chlorine truck bomb killed 2 members of the Iraqi 
security force and wounded 16 others. 
• February 20, 2007: A chlorine attack in Baghdad killed 5 and injured 140. 
• February 21, 2007: A chlorine attack in Taji killed 9 and sickened 150. 
• March 17, 2007: A three-pronged attack using chlorine bombs was staged 
in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Amiriya.  Two people were killed and over 360 
were poisoned as a result of the attacks. 
• March 27, 2007: A truck packed with explosives and chlorine canisters 
exploded killing 1 Iraqi and wounding 7 in Ramadi.  A second truck was 
found outside a police station and disarmed.  The driver was captured 
before he could detonate the explosives.11 
With all of this evidence, there can be no doubt that terrorists are interested in 
using hazmat trucks as weapons within the borders of the United States. The Department 
of Transportation (DOT) recognizes that hazmat trucks are “dangerous and ready-made 
                                                 
9 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test Volume I: Evaluation 
Final Report Executive Summary (McLean, VA: SAIC, 2004). 
10 Mark Clayton, “Hazardous-Materials Trucks: Terror Threat?” Christian Science Monitor, July 7, 
2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0707/p02s01-usgn.html (accessed March 11, 2008). 
11 Bill Roggio, “Another Chlorine Truck Bomb Found near Ramadi,” The Long War Journal, March 
27, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/another_chlorine_tru.php (accessed March 18, 
2008). 
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weapons” and are “especially attractive” to terrorists.12   Stephen Gale, a University of 
Pennsylvania professor and terrorism expert, agrees that hazmat trucks are essentially 
ready-made bombs that are “tailor-made” for terrorists to conduct an attack at the lowest 
cost and with the greatest impact.13  In fact, terrorism experts consider trucks to be one of 
the best tools a terrorist can use to breach security measures and carry explosives since 
the U.S. airline industry significantly increased security procedures.14  Although 
terrorists’ use of hazmat trucks in attacks within the United States is rare,15 the following 
events have taken place within the United States and are indicative of hazmat trucking 
security concerns. 
• September 2001: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Nabil 
Almarabh, a man on their watch list who had obtained a hazmat license.16 
• October 2001: The FBI charged 19 men with fraudulently obtaining 
Pennsylvania hazmat licenses.  A driver’s license examiner in Pittsburgh 
helped at least 18 men get hazmat permits without taking the required 
tests.  The examiner said he worked with a middleman named Abdul 
Mohamman and was paid $50 to $100 for each person he helped.17  When 
Mohamman was arrested, he had a newspaper clipping about Ahmed 
Ressam, an operative for Osama bin Laden who was convicted of an 
aborted millennium bomb plot.18 
• August 2006: The FBI warned of a possible fuel-truck attack in a major 
U.S. city.19 
                                                 
12 Roggio, “Another Chlorine Truck Bomb Found near Ramadi,” 2. 
13 Dante Chinni, “America's Roads May Be Just as Vulnerable as Its Skies,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, October 1, 2001, 1.  
14 National Hazardous Material Commercial Vehicle Tracking System Study (Charlottesville, VA: 
Accelerated Solutions, 2006), 11. 
15 Two important truck-based terror attacks in U.S. history were the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 that killed 168 people and the February 26, 1993 
bombing of Tower One of the World Trade Center in New York City that killed 6 people and injured 1,042.  
In each of these cases, terrorists used rental trucks filled with explosives as opposed to hazmat trucks to 
carry out their attacks.  This thesis is not designed to address the security issues related to non-hazmat 
trucks such as those used in these two cases. 
16 Chinni, “America’s Roads,” 2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Brian Bloquist and Tracy Connor, “Cops Nab Ten in Haz-mat Scheme,” The New York Post, 
September 27, 2001, 011. 
19Clayton, “Hazardous-Materials Trucks,” 1. 
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2. Statistics 
There is no doubt that the threat is real and the terrorists are acting on their 
desires.  America needs to secure its hazmat motor carriers.  To understand the gravity of 
the problem, one need only look at the statistics.  Almost 15% of the total shipping 
tonnage in the U.S. is hazmat, which is almost exclusively moved by trucks.20  Of the 
overall hazmat shipments by truck, 1.2% are considered to be toxic inhalation hazards 
(TIHs).21  Most motor carrier hazmat shipments involve flammable liquids, such as 
gasoline (82%), followed by gases (6.2%), and corrosive materials (5.1%).22   
These hazmat trucks, when full, cross America’s roads approximately 800,000 
times per day, and of those, 300,000 hauls are classified as extreme risk.23  There are 
57,714 hazmat carriers, 3,982,703 hazmat trucks, and 1,765,631 hazmat drivers 
registered with the DOT.24 Half of all carriers’ business is short hauls that occur entirely 
within a state.25  Most of these shipments are hauled by local fleets that operate on thin 
profit margins.26 Add to this the fact that 98% of the trucking industry is made up of 
small businesses, those companies with 28 or fewer trucks used in daily operations, 82% 
of which own fewer than 7 trucks,27 and the enormity of the security challenge becomes 
clear.   
C. SUMMARY 
The threat is here and it is obvious.  Terrorist organizations have used and their 
actions expose a continuing desire to use hazmat trucks as weapons of terror within the 
United States.  A summary of prior attacks exposes a propensity for terrorists to use fuel 
                                                 
20 National Hazardous Material Commercial Vehicle Tracking System Study, 11. 
21 Anonymous government source. 
22 Ibid. 
23 National hazardous Material Commercial Vehicle Tracking System Study, 12. 
24 Anonymous government source. 




and propane trucks as well as trucks loaded with chlorine canisters.  Perhaps this is the 
case because a great majority of hazmat shipments consist of flammable liquids like 
gasoline or liquefied gases.  Of these shipments, 98% are short hauls transported by small 
carriers operating on thin profit margins and mostly within a single state.  There can be 
no debate about the high level of risk these vehicles pose to America’s transportation 
security.  
1. Research Question 
The ability of the government to secure every hazardous materials motor carrier 
against terrorist attack is severely limited, yet the potential that hazardous materials 
trucks will be used in terrorist attacks is great.  Therefore, can the security of hazardous 
materials motor carriers of all types be improved voluntarily and quickly by realigning 
existing resources and instituting a plan that leverages market forces and other 
incentives?   
This research will examine how, through the development of a unique voluntary 
incentive-based program, TSA can leverage existing resources as well as successful ideas 
from private sector and governmental programs to rapidly and significantly enhance the 
security of hazardous materials motor carriers.   
2. Methodology 
This thesis will examine a full range of government policies, statutes, and 
regulations affecting the security of hazardous materials motor carriers.  Specifically it 
will review Homeland Security Presidential Directive number 7, Executive Order 11346, 
and testimony from the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration.   
Statutes to be addressed are the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007.  Finally, TSA and DOT have issued numerous regulations addressing the 
problem, which will be explained. 
A review of governmental action in this arena, including the DOT study on 
Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology and the TSA Truck Tracking Pilot,  
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as well as additional governmental programs, will enhance the reader’s understanding of 
the efforts put forth to date.  This information is supplemented by a series of in-person 
interviews with both government and industry officials. 
Finally, a series of private and public sector programs will be analyzed.  These 
programs include two examples from the private sector and six from the public sector.  
The private sector programs are the Responsible Care® program established by the 
American Chemistry Council and the Responsible Distribution ProcessSM established by 
the National Association of Chemical Distributors.  The public sector programs are the 
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency’s Energy Star program; the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s OSHA Star program; the National Park 
Service Historic Preservation Tax Incentive program; Virginia’s Enterprise Zone 
Program; Free and Secure Trade (FAST), a program developed by the United States 
Customs and Border Protection, Canada, and Mexico; and finally the United States Coast 
Guard’s Port Security Grants Program. 
After an analysis of hazmat motor carrier security and the existing gaps between 
what is desired and the current status, a model built upon successful elements of the 
private and public sector programs will be crafted to offer a viable incentive-based 
solution.  This model will allow TSA to quickly and efficiently enhance its hazmat motor 
carrier security program. 
3. Literature Review 
The literature concerning the security of hazardous materials trucking is sparse.  
There is even less material concerning incentive-based approaches to address the 
problem.  To best address the issue, it is necessary to review the literature first 
concerning the framework of the problem and then drawing upon other disciplines to 
extrapolate information that can be used as a basis for a solution.  The literature can be 
divided into five distinct categories.  First, there is information concerning government 




to agency actions.  Fourth is literature describing unique programs developed by industry.  
And finally, the fifth category is made up of information concerning some unique 
governmental incentive programs.   
Government policy consists of a Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 
Executive Order, and Agency testimony.  Specifically, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive number 7 “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection”28 
addresses the need to implement tactical security improvements to deter, mitigate, or 
neutralize potential attacks as well as the need to establish security programs 
incorporating risk management activities and metrics29 for critical infrastructure sectors 
including chemical and ground/surface transportation systems.30 
Executive Order 13416 titled “Strengthening Surface Transportation” signed by 
the President on December 5, 2006 established the nation’s policy and sought the 
implementation of a comprehensive, coordinated, and efficient security program to 
protect surface transportation systems within and adjacent to the United States against 
terrorist attacks.31 
Finally, in two different sets of testimony before Congress, Transportation 
Security Administration Administrator Kip Hawley addressed the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security of the Committee on Appropriations of the United States House of 
Representatives to discuss the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA.32  In 
his address, Mr. Hawley discussed funding for surface transportation security.  He also 
explained that he encouraged an effective network of local security where each individual 
surface transportation stakeholder can make a strategic and deliberate decision when they 
develop their annual budgets as to where security-related investments should be made.   
                                                 
28 President, “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,” Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 (December 17, 2003). 
29 Ibid., 14. 
30 Ibid., 15. 
31 President, Executive Order 13416, “Strengthening Surface Transportation Security,” Federal 
Register 71, no. 235 (December 7, 2006): 71033. 
32 Statement of Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, before the 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of 
Representatives. 
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Similarly, in testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, on January 18, 2007, Assistant Secretary Hawley provided 
an update to Congress on TSA’s hazmat motor carrier security programs.  He explained 
that TSA’s plan to address security gaps would include “a number of voluntary incentive 
programs and regulatory options.”33 
Congress also plays an important part contributing to the literature in the field.  
Specifically, Congressional action through the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 established 
the requirement for background checks on drivers applying for hazmat endorsements.34  
Additionally, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 established a series of motor carrier 
security requirements addressing issues including truck security assessments, a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between DOT and DHS, the truck security grant 
program, hazardous materials highway routing, security-sensitive material tracking, and 
hazardous materials security inspections.35   
The next category of literature is derived from Agency action in the field.  
Specifically, the DOT implemented various security actions related to hazmat motor 
carriers.  It published a regulation requiring safety and security plans,36 conducted 






                                                 
33 Statement of Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate (January 18, 2007), 8. 
34 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 49 USC § 5103a (2001). 
35 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 
Stat. 266. 
36 Hazardous Materials Table, Special Provisions, Hazardous Materials Communications, Emergency 
Response Information, Training Requirements, and Security Plans, 49 CFR § 172.800 (2003). 
37 Report on FMCSA’s Security Sensitivity Visits to the House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations (January 31, 2002). 
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permits,38 and studied security technologies in the three-volume report titled Hazardous 
Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test published in November 
2004.39   
TSA issued the Hazardous Materials Endorsements and Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential regulation that provides for credentialing and security threat 
assessments of certain land transportation workers.40  In addition, there exists scant 
information related to TSA’s Corporate Security Review program,41 grants,42 truck 
tracking center program,43 and voluntary Security Action Items.44  
The fourth area of the literature is information produced by industry trade groups.  
One example is the Responsible Care® program established by the American Chemistry 
Council (ACC).  This is an internal quality assurance program developed for its 
members.  A wide range of information concerning this program is published on the 
Internet.45  Through its web site, ACC offers information about the program and its 
successes.46  It publishes its security code, which addresses facility, cyber, and 
                                                 
38 Safety Fitness Procedures, 49 CFR § 385.403 (1988). 
39 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test Volume I: Evaluation 
Final Report Executive Summary, 1; D. Stock et al., Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology 
Field Operational Test Volume II: Evaluation Final Report Synthesis (Washington, D.C.: Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. DOT, 2004); Volume III is unavailable as it contains sensitive security 
information. 
40 Credentialing and Background Checks for Maritime and Land Transportation Security, 49 CFR part 
1572 (2003). 
41 Transportation Security Administration, “Programs,” 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highway/programs.shtm (accessed October 22, 2008). 
42 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Administration of the Federal 
Trucking Industry Security Grant Program for FY 2004 and FY 2005 (October 29, 2007). 
43 Decision Support System for a National HAZMAT Truck Tracking Center (Charlottesville, VA: The 
Accelerated Masters Program in Systems Engineering, 2007). 
44 Transportation Security Administration, “Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM) Security 
Action Items (SAIs),” http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highway/hssm_sai.shtm (accessed October 
22, 2008). 
45 American Chemistry Council, “Responsible Care,” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_responsiblecare/sec.asp?CID=1298&DID=4841 (accessed October 
14, 2008). 
46 American Chemistry Council, “Performance through Responsible Care,” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_responsiblecare/doc.asp?CID=1298&DID=5084 (accessed October 
14, 2008). 
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transportation security and requires companies to conduct comprehensive security 
vulnerability assessments (SVAs) of their facilities, implement security enhancements, 
and obtain independent verification that those enhancements have been made. The code 
also requires companies to create security management systems, which are documented 
to provide quality control and assurances.47  In addition to security, ACC requires strict 
standards in management systems and then reports details of the program and individual 
member compliance statistics to provide credibility to the program.48 
A similar program is the Responsible Distribution ProcessSM developed by the 
National Association of Chemical Distributors (NACD).  This too is an internal quality 
assurance program aimed specifically at chemical distributors.  Like ACC, NACD 
publishes information about its program on the Internet.49  The program operates under 
eight guiding principles related to health, safety, security, and environmental 
performance.50  It also publishes a twelve-part Code of Management Practice with which 
each member must comply.51  Additionally, information concerning third-party 





                                                 
47 American Chemistry Council, “Responsible Care Security Code,” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_responsiblecare/doc.asp?CID=1298&DID=5085 (accessed October 
14, 2008). 
48 American Chemistry Council, “Ensuring Accountability Through Management System 
Certification,” http://reporting.responsiblecare-us.com/reports/rcmsc_cmpny_rpt.aspx (accessed October 
14, 2008). 
49 National Association of Chemical Distributors, “Responsible Distribution Process,” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/ (accessed October 14, 2008). 
50 National Association of Chemical Distributors, “Guiding Principles,” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdpguide.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008). 
51 National Association of Chemical Distributors, “Code of Management Practice,” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdpcode.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008). 
52 National Association of Chemical Distributors, “Third Party Verification,” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdpverification.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008). 
53 National Association of Chemical Distributors, “RDP Compliance Timetable for NACD 
Candidates,” http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdp_compliance.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008). 
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membership and performance data are available for each year of the program, but this 
information is only available in the aggregate and is not attributable to specific members 
like the ACC Responsible Care® program.54   
Finally, the fifth category is made up of information concerning unique 
governmental incentive programs.  These programs include the Department of Energy 
and Environmental Protection Agency’s Energy Star program; the Occupational and 
Health Administration’s OSHA Star program; the National Park Service’s Historic 
Preservation Tax Incentive program; Virginia’s Enterprise Zone Program; Free and 
Secure Trade, a program developed by the United States Customs and Border Protection, 
Canada, and Mexico; and finally the Homeland Security Port Security Grants Program.   
The Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency’s Energy Star 
program publishes significant information about its program on the Internet.55   Examples 
of the information available include a history of the program, a detailed program 
summary, and links to annual reports memorializing major milestones.56  There is also 
information about program partners, awards programs and recipients, and news clips 
related to the program.57  Add to this a complete list of major milestones achieved by the 
program,58 as well as a detailed newsletter,59 and one can gain a complete understanding 
of the program. 
                                                 
54 National Association of Chemical Distributors, “Measuring the Impact of the Responsible 
Distribution Process on Environmental, Health, Safety, & Security Performance,” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdp_indices_members.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008). 
55 U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, “Energy Star,” 
http://www.energystar.gov/ (accessed October 14, 2008). 
56 U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, “About Energy Star,” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_index (accessed October 14, 2008). 
57 U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, “Energy Star Partners,” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=news.nr_partners (accessed October 14, 2008). 
58 U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, “Major Milestones,” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_milestones (accessed October 14, 2008). 
59 U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, “Fall 2008 Energy Star News,” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=news.nr_fall2008 (accessed October 14, 2008). 
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The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s OSHA Star program also 
maintains an active web presence.60  Their web site provides background information 
under a section titled All About VPP.61  It also contains a full set of policies and 
procedures as well as information concerning Federal Register entries.62  Like the ACC’s 
Responsible Care® program, OSHA provides a full list of participants and their status 
under the program.63  It also provides details about other program initiatives and pilot 
projects.64  A reader may also access news releases and a list of success stories as well as 
links to VPP Partners’ web sites.65  Finally, OSHA maintains an on-line library complete 
with data and statistics about the program and other related materials.66 
The National Park Service’s Historic Preservation Tax Incentive program, like the 
other government web sites, hosts a great deal of information about its program.  There is 
a detailed portion of the web site dedicated to information about the tax incentive 
program and its different tax incentives.67  The site also provides another full section 
related to incentive programs for income-producing properties.68  The certification 
application and guidance related to the application are also all available on the web.69  
While the amount of information available on this site is extensive, the portions 
mentioned supra are the most relevant to this thesis. 
                                                 
60 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “Voluntary Protection 
Programs,” http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.html (accessed October 14, 2008). 
61 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “All about VPP,” 
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/all_about_vpp.html (accessed October 14, 2008). 
62 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “Policies and 
Procedures,” http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/vpp_policy.html (accessed October 14, 2008). 





67 National Park Service, “Historic Preservation Tax Incentives,” 
http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/tps/tax/brochure1.htm (accessed October 14, 2008). 
68 National Park Service, “Incentives!” http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/tax/incentives/index.htm (accessed 
October 14, 2008). 
69 National Park Service, “Historic Preservation Certification Application,” 
http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/tax/hpcappl.htm (accessed October 14, 2008). 
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Virginia’s Enterprise Zone Program also offers a large amount of information 
related to its program on its own web site.70  The site includes a description of the 
program and relevant links to guide readers through the process.  It also offers links to 
forms, publications, and even text of relevant legislation.71 
The Free and Secure Trade program is documented in several different places on 
the Internet.  A detailed library of information is available from the United States 
Customs and Border Protection web site that contains a section dedicated to FAST.72  
This web site contains information about the genesis of the program as well as its 
provisions related to Canada and Mexico.  It also provides details about every element of 
the program, specifically about all aspects of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism.73   Additionally, the White House issued a press release offering details when 
the program was launched in partnership with Canada.74  Even Canada’s Border 
Service’s Agency maintains its own web site with public information about the 
program.75 
Finally, the Port Security Grants Program (PSGP) offered through DHS is 
discussed on the Internet as part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA) web site.76  FEMA manages and administers all homeland security grants for 
DHS.  Unlike other government web sites, there is only one meaningful reference to the  
 
                                                 
70 Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development, “Virginia Enterprise Zone 
Program,” 
http://www.dhcd.virginia.gov/CommunityDevelopmentRevitalization/Virginia_Enterprise_Zones.htm 
(accessed October 14, 2008). 
71 Ibid. 
72 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “FAST: Free and Secure Trade Program,” 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/fast/ (accessed October 14, 2008). 
73 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “What Is Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-
TPAT)?” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ (accessed October 14, 2008). 
74 The White House, “United States – Canada Free and Secure Trade Program,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020909-3.html (accessed October 14, 2008). 
75 Canada Border Services Agency, “Free and Secure Trade,” http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/prog/fast-
expres/menu-eng.html (accessed October 14, 2008). 
76 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FY 2009 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP),” 
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/psgp/index.shtm (accessed October 14, 2008). 
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PSGP.  This is the Program Guidance and Application Kit published in February 2008.  It 
provides a full explanation of the program and details concerning funding, the application 
and evaluation process, allowable expenses, and guidance for specialized applicants.77   
                                                 
77 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Fiscal Year 2008 Port Security Grant Program Guidance 
and Application Kit,” http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/psgp/fy08_psgp_guidance.pdf (accessed 
October 14, 2008). 
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III. RECOGNITION OF THE THREAT 
The American government has been aware of the threat posed by hazmat trucks 
for decades.  Prior to 9/11, however, the government primarily focused its hazmat lens on 
safety, rather than security issues.  It was not until the events of 9/11 that the threat posed 
by these ready-made weapons became real.  Since 9/11, the government has recognized 
and spoken out about the need to better secure America’s entire critical infrastructure, 
including its transportation network.  At this point, if a terrorist should succeed in using a 
hazmat truck as a weapon, it will not be due to America’s failure to imagine the threat; it 
will be due to America’s failure to act on that threat. 
A. PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 
1. Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7 
The terrorist threat posed by a failure to secure America’s hazmat trucks has been 
addressed by the President through Directive and Executive Order.  On December 17, 
2003, The President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive number 7 (HSPD-
7).78  In this Directive, he made clear that “in addition to strategic security enhancements, 
tactical security improvements can be rapidly implemented to deter, mitigate, or 
neutralize potential attacks” (emphasis added).79  He charged the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to establish security programs incorporating risk management activities and 
metrics80 for critical infrastructure sectors including chemical and ground/surface 
transportation systems.81  He required the Secretary to work closely with other federal 
departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector in  
 
                                                 
78 President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 7. 
79 Ibid., 5. 
80 Ibid., 14. 
81 Ibid., 15. 
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accomplishing the objectives of the directive.82  He even specifically required the DOT 
and DHS to collaborate on all matters relating to transportation security and to regulate 
the transportation of hazardous materials.83    
As a result of HSPD-7, Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of DHS issued the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in 2006.  The NIPP incorporated the 
HSPD-7 requirements and established a risk management framework as its cornerstone.  
The framework establishes the process for combining consequence, vulnerability, and 
threat information to produce a comprehensive, systematic, and rational assessment of 
national or sector risk.84  This framework is illustrated in Figure 1 and is the strategy to 




Figure 1.   NIPP Risk Management Framework 
2. Executive Order 13416 
On December 5, 2006, the President signed Executive Order 13416 titled 
“Strengthening Surface Transportation.”  In this Order, he established that federal, state,  
 
                                                 
82 President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 17. 
83 Ibid., 22(h). 
84 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2006), 4. 
85 Ibid. 
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local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, all share the responsibility for 
surface transportation security.86  He then expressed the nation’s policy in this arena as 
follows. 
It is the policy of the United States to protect the people, property, and 
territory of the United States by facilitating the implementation of a 
comprehensive, coordinated, and efficient security program to protect 
surface transportation systems within and adjacent to the United States 
against terrorist attacks.87 
In this Order, he assigned the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal 
official responsible for protecting surface transportation infrastructure.88  The Secretary 
was directed to work in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation to do the 
following. 
• assess the security of each transportation mode 
• develop a comprehensive transportation systems sector-specific plan 
• develop an annex to the comprehensive transportation systems sector 
specific plan that addresses each surface transportation mode 
• in consultation with state, local, and tribal government officials and the 
private sector, identify surface transportation modes or components 
thereof that are subject to high risk of terrorist attack and draft appropriate 
security guidelines or security requirements to mitigate such risks 
• develop, implement, and lead a process to coordinate research, 
development, testing, and evaluation of technologies relating to the 
protection of surface transportation 
• use security grants authorized by law to assist in implementing security 
requirements and security guidelines issued pursuant to law89 
                                                 
86 President, Executive Order 13416, § 1. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. § 3. 
89 Ibid. 
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B. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACTION 
1. Testimony before Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the 
Committee on Appropriations of the United States House of 
Representatives 
The Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration, Kip 
Hawley, addressed TSA’s implementation of the requirements in Executive Order 13416 
when he addressed the Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the Committee on 
Appropriations of the United States House of Representatives to discuss the President’s 
fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA.90  In his address, Mr. Hawley clarified that the 
budget request included $41.4 million for surface transportation security.  DHS, DOT, 
and TSA were all working together with surface transportation stakeholders to enhance 
security through partnerships, proposed regulations, and grant awards. 
Mr. Hawley explained that TSA uses a risk-based model to rank priorities in this 
arena.  Some of the highest priorities identified by TSA for fiscal year 2008 were grant 
priority for underwater and underground tunnels in mass transit and TIHs in the rail 
environment.  He stressed that TSA implements its strategies through cooperation with 
stakeholders where appropriate, regulation and inspection where necessary, and the 
distribution of grants to assist the industry to implement the objectives set forth.  In fact, 
while not funded by TSA, grant programs are an important element of DHS’s approach to 
the surface transportation security strategy.  By staying true to this plan, each individual 
surface transportation stakeholder can make a strategic and deliberate decision when they 
develop their annual budgets as to where security-related investments should be made.  
This model encourages an effective network of local security rather than relying on a 
larger federal workforce to address the same issues. 
                                                 
90 Statement of Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, before the 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of 
Representatives. 
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2. Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation 
Similarly, in testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, on January 18, 2007, Assistant Secretary Hawley provided a 
status report on TSA’s hazmat trucking security progress.91  In that statement he 
informed the Committee that TSA had been conducting Corporate Security Reviews 
(CSRs) to assess readiness and vulnerabilities of different motor carriers.  TSA’s analysis 
led them to focus security efforts on TIH chemicals and other hazardous chemicals of 
concern, including explosives.  
He stated that TSA has been working with industry to establish baseline security 
standards for TIH and other chemicals of concern.  These standards are expected to 
address issues such as vehicle tracking, vehicle attendance, vehicle alarm systems, truck 
cab access controls, and locking fifth wheel on tank trailers as well as security route and 
stop areas.  Once the baseline is established, TSA plans to begin identifying and 
addressing gaps.  The plan is to do so by use of “a number of voluntary incentive 
programs and regulatory options.”92 
C. SUMMARY 
The President and the Assistant Secretary for TSA recognize the risks posed by 
hazmat motor carriers and affirm their commitment to address those risks.  They each 
espouse specific principles they expect to be followed when devising and implementing 
strategies to mitigate the risk.  Specifically, there is an expectation that tactical security 
enhancements will be readily implemented.  Security measures will be based on risk 
management strategies and metrics.  The federal government will partner with state and 
local governments as well as the private sector to develop an effective network of 
security that is not reliant solely on the federal workforce.  These plans will be enacted 
through the use of security grants, voluntary actions, and regulation. 
                                                 
91 Statement of Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate (January 18, 2007). 
92 Ibid., 8. 
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IV. CLARIFYING ROLES 
A. DHS AND DOT 
While DHS and DOT both recognize the need for action in securing America’s 
hazmat motor carriers, a systemic failure to clarify their roles in terms of which agency 
held primary responsibility to address hazmat motor carrier security made it difficult to 
devise and implement a security plan.  Prior to 9/11, DOT was responsible for hazmat 
truck safety and security issues.  In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress 
passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001.93  This Act 
assigned to TSA the responsibility to secure all modes of transportation.  In 2001, TSA 
was a part of DOT.  Shortly thereafter, in 2002, Congress established DHS through the 
Homeland Security Act.94  This legislation transferred TSA into DHS and gave DHS 
responsibility for protecting the nation from terrorism, including the protection of the 
nation’s transportation systems.   
At this point, TSA was designated the lead agency responsible for the security of 
hazmat vehicles95 while DOT maintained a regulatory role related to safety.96  However, 
the Homeland Security Act also expanded DOT’s responsibilities to include both the 
safety and security of hazardous materials transportation.97  The DOT component 
Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) was therefore responsible  
 
 
                                                 
93 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 STAT. 597 (2001). 
94 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
95 See Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (Dec. 17, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13416 (Dec. 5 
2006); 71 Fed. Reg. 71033 (Dec. 5, 2006); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007); Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 
96 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 49 USC § 5103a (2001). 
97 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
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for the security plan requirements of hazmat carriers98 while the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA) maintained inspectors to enforce security regulations 
through a periodic review of the content and implementation of the security plans.99 
In 2004, DHS and DOT entered into a MOU to clarify their respective roles and 
responsibilities regarding transportation security.100  That MOU was further clarified by 
annex in 2006 to specifically address the transportation of hazardous materials.  This 
annex establishes TSA as the lead federal entity responsible for the security of the 
transportation of hazardous materials and PHMSA as responsible for the promulgation 
and enforcement of regulations addressing safety and security of the transportation of 
hazardous materials.101  Unfortunately, the roles of the two agencies regarding motor 
carrier transportation security matters remain unclear.  The Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act thus require the two to clarify their 
respective roles and delineate responsibilities, resources, and commitments by 
completing an additional annex to their MOU no later than 2008.102 
B. SUMMARY 
While the confusion over DHS and DOT roles and responsibilities remains 
unclear, the threat continues to linger, time continues to pass, and opportunities for action 
continue to be lost.  If these agencies complete an additional annex to their MOU as 
required by Congress, their roles may finally be clarified to the extent necessary for them 
to focus on security concerns.  As of the writing of this thesis, the government has made 
little progress in securing hazmat trucks, especially those owned by smaller carriers who 
haul the highly vulnerable flammable liquids and gases.   
                                                 
98 The term “hazmat carrier” refers to the transportation of hazmat through different modes and not 
specifically by motor carrier.  
99 Anonymous government source. 
100 This memorandum of understanding was signed by DOT and DHS on September 28, 2004. 
101 Anonymous government source. 
102 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 
Stat. 266 (2007). 
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V. ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED 
To better understand America’s current security programs, it is important to 
review actions by Congress, DOT, and TSA. 
A. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
1. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
One of the first pieces of legislation passed by Congress after 9/11 that contained 
any provision addressing transportation security, other than ATSA, was the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001.103  This legislation implemented a limitation upon the states 
prohibiting the issuance of a license to operate a motor vehicle transporting hazardous 
materials to any individual until that person has undergone and passed a satisfactory 
background check.104  This same legislation extended the background check 
requirements to commercial motor vehicle operators registered to operate in Canada or 
Mexico who wish to transport hazardous materials in the United States.105 
2. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
The most recent legislation addressing hazmat motor carrier security contains a 
series of six specific provisions enumerated in the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.106  
These provisions address the requirement for a truck security assessment, clarification of 
roles between DOT and DHS, a review of the trucking security grant program, highway 
routing of hazardous trucks, tracking of security-sensitive materials, and a study on 
hazmat security inspections. 
                                                 
103 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 49 USC § 5103a (2001). 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 
Stat. 266 (2007). 
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a. Truck Security Assessment  
Section 1540 requires DHS, in coordination with DOT, to study certain 
trucks carrying specified hazardous materials in a quantity sufficient to require placarding 
and issue a report to Congress that includes the following. 
• a security risk assessment of the trucking industry 
• an assessment of actions already taken by public and private entities 
• an assessment of the economic impact of security requirements on the 
industry 
• an assessment of current research and the need for future research into 
security 
• an assessment of industry best practices 
• an assessment of the current status of secure truck parking 
b. Memorandum of Understanding 
In section 1541, DOT and DHS are required to execute an annex to the 
memorandum of understanding between the two agencies that delineates each of their 
specific roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments to address security matters. 
c. Report on Trucking Security Grant Program 
The DHS Inspector General is required in section 1542 to submit to 
Congress a report on the trucking security grant program oversight and expenditures and 
to make recommendations regarding the future of the program, including options to 
improve the effectiveness and utility of the program and motor carrier security. 
d. Hazardous Materials Highway Routing 
Section 1553 requires the Secretary of Transportation, in conjunction with 
the Secretary for DHS, to document and assess the current and proposed routes for 
hazardous materials and develop a framework for using a geographic-information-
system-based approach to characterize routes in the national hazardous materials route 
registry as well as identify measurable criteria for selecting routes.  It also requires an 
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analysis of route-related regulations in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico and a review of 
safety and security concerns related to their routes.  Additionally, it requires that 
guidance materials be prepared for state officials to assist them with safety and security 
concerns of hazardous materials routed through their state.  Also, the safety and security 
benefits achieved under current route plans for explosives and radioactive materials must 
be assessed and reported to Congress. 
An additional requirement provides that specified hazmat motor carriers 
must maintain, follow, and carry a route plan when carrying specified types and 
quantities of hazardous materials if the Secretary of Transportation determines that such a 
requirement would enhance security and safety without imposing unreasonable costs or 
burdens upon motor carriers. 
e. Security-Sensitive Material Tracking 
Section 1554 requires TSA to develop a program to facilitate tracking of 
motor carrier shipments of certain security-sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used 
in such shipments with technology that provides for frequent or continuous 
communication, vehicle position, location and tracking capabilities, and emergency 
distress signal capability.  Congress also provides for funding of these requirements for 
fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010 in the amounts of $7,000,000 each year, $300,000 of 
which must be spent on equipment each year.  However, Congress specifically prohibits 
TSA from mandating the installation or utilization of any related technology without 
additional Congressional authority. 
In essence, Congress is providing for the development and further testing 
of a truck tracking program at the government’s expense.  The program will only apply to 
vehicles carrying what TSA defines as security-sensitive materials, which in essence are 
explosives and chemicals posing a toxic inhalation hazard. 
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f. Hazardous Materials Security Inspections 
This section, 1555, was enacted to require DOT and DHS to address the 
problem of duplicative reviews of hazardous materials security plans and to assess the 
insurance, security, and safety costs associated with hazmat transport.   
3. Hazardous Materials Endorsements and Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential 
An additional federal regulation provides for credentialing and security threat 
assessments of certain land transportation workers.107  In relevant part, applicants who 
are seeking to obtain or renew a hazardous materials endorsement (HME) to their 
commercial driver’s license must provide specified information so that TSA can conduct 
a security threat assessment before issuing a Determination of No Security Threat to the 
appropriate state agency responsible for issuing a HME.108  A security threat assessment 
includes a fingerprint-based criminal history records check (CHRC), an intelligence-
related background check, and a final disposition.109  If TSA determines that the 
individual poses a threat, the state must immediately revoke a current HME and refrain 
from issuing or renewing a HME.110  Similarly, an individual may seek to apply for or 
renew a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) card.  TWICs are 
tamper-resistant biometric credentials that will be issued to workers who require 





                                                 
107 Credentialing and Background Checks for Maritime and Land Transportation Security, 49 CFR 
part 1572 (2003). 
108 Ibid. at 49 CFR § 1572.9. 
109 Ibid. at 49 CFR § 1572.15. 
110 Ibid. at 49 CFR § 1572.13. 
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all credentialed merchant mariners.111 To obtain credentials, drivers must undergo and 
pass a security threat assessment.112  In either case, applicants will be required to pay an 
information collection fee, threat assessment fee, and FBI fee.113 
The security threat assessment requirements are designed to help the government 
ensure that individuals who pose a threat to security do not legally gain access to 
hazardous materials by working as a licensed driver or as a transportation worker that has 
unescorted access to secure areas of ports or vessels.  Prior to the implementation of this 
regulation, an individual who may have been listed as a terrorist on an intelligence-
related government database could have been legally licensed to transport or access 
hazardous materials.  However, hazmat carriers often object to the apparent duplication 
of effort required when they are told they are required to undergo a background check to 
obtain an HME and then undergo a second background check to obtain a TWIC card.   
B. DOT ACTIONS 
In addition to Congressional action, DOT also implemented various security 
actions related to hazmat motor carriers.  Specifically, DOT published a regulation 
requiring safety and security plans, conducted security sensitivity visits, implemented a 
requirement for hazardous materials safety permits, and studied security technologies. 
1. Safety and Security Plans 
On March 25, 2003, DOT issued a regulation addressing the security risks related 
to the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce.  The regulation required that by 
September 25, 2003, each person who offers for transportation or who transports 
specified hazardous materials must develop and adhere to a security plan that meets 
                                                 
111 Transportation Security Administration, “Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
(TWIC),” http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/twic/index.shtm (accessed April 2, 2008). 
112 Credentialing and Background Checks for Maritime and Land Transportation Security, 49 CFR 
part 1572 (2003). 
113 Ibid., at 49 CFR 1572.404, 1572.405. 
 32
specified requirements.114  The security plan must include an assessment of risks and 
measures to address those risks.  Additionally, it must include elements addressing 
personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security.115 
The personnel security section of the plan must provide for measures to confirm 
information provided by job applicants hired for positions that involve access to and 
handling of the hazardous materials covered by the security plan.116  The unauthorized 
access provision must provide for measures to address the assessed risk that unauthorized 
persons may gain access to the hazardous materials covered by the security plan.117  
Finally, the en route security provision must address the assessed security risks of 
shipments of hazardous materials covered by the security plan en route from origin to 
destination, including shipments stored incidental to movement.118 
2. Security Sensitivity Visits 
After 9/11, the FMCSA initiated a program to conduct on-site visits to motor 
carriers to discuss security enhancements.  It states that its mission is “to increase the 
level of awareness of hazardous materials carriers to terrorist threats, identify potential 
weaknesses in carrier security programs, and report potentially serious security issues to 
the appropriate authorities.”119  Visits consist of face-to-face meetings by FMCSA or 
state investigators and top carrier officials to assess security vulnerabilities and 
countermeasures and make security recommendations.120   
                                                 
114 Hazardous Materials Table, Special Provisions, Hazardous Materials Communications, Emergency 
Response Information, Training Requirements, and Security Plans, 49 CFR § 172.800 (2003). 
115 49 CFR § 172.802 (2003). 
116 49 CFR § 172.802(a)(1) (2003). 
117 49 CFR § 172.800(a)(2) (2003). 
118 49 CFR § 172.800(a)(3) (2003). 
119 Report on FMCSA’s Security Sensitivity Visits to the House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations (January 13, 2002). 
120 Ibid. 
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3. Hazardous Materials Safety Permits 
As of January 1, 2005, the FMCSA started phasing in a hazardous materials 
safety permitting program.  This program applies only to a limited community of high 
hazard materials including radioactive substances, explosives, materials poisonous by 
inhalation, and liquefied gases with a methane content of at least 85%.121  According to 
the program, such carriers must apply for and receive a safety permit from the FMCSA 
before they can transport these materials on America’s roadways.122   
In order to obtain a safety permit, the motor carrier must have a satisfactory safety 
rating that is obtained by the carrier certifying that it has a crash rate in the top 30% of 
the national average, a total out-of-service rate in the top 30%, and a satisfactory security 
program that includes a security plan, a communications plan, and certification that all 
hazmat employees have completed security training.123  Additionally, each carrier must 
be registered with the Research and Special Programs Administration.124 
4. Technological Solutions for Hazmat Truck Security  
In 2004, the FMCSA published the results of a study it conducted of security 
technology options for hazmat motor carriers.  This study began in September 2003 and 
ended in April 2004.  The study results as published by FMCSA do not provide specific 
details of the products tested in terms of manufacturer or model numbers.  Instead, the 
study focuses on technology as divided into twelve types.125  Some motor carriers have 
made the independent business decision to install some of this technology, but there are 
no governmental requirements or incentives regarding the purchase, installation, or use of 
any of it.  The technologies tested as divided by type are as follows. 
 
                                                 
121 Safety Fitness Procedures, 49 CFR § 385.403 (1988). 
122 49 CFR 385.401 (1988). 
123 49 CFR 385.407 (1988). 
124 49 CFR 385.407(c) (1988). 
125 D. Stock et al., Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test 
Volume II: Evaluation Final Report Synthesis (Washington, D.C.: Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, U.S. DOT, 2004). 
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• wireless satellite and terrestrial communications systems 
• digital phone without a global positioning system (GPS) 
• panic buttons 
• global login 
• biometric global login 
• electronic supply chain manifest 
• intelligent on-board computers initiating remote vehicle disabling 
• internal trailer door locking system 
• external electronic seal 
• geofencing 
• tethered trailer tracking 
• untethered trailer tracking 
a. Wireless Satellite and Terrestrial Communications Systems  
Wireless satellite technology is designed to function with a satellite-based 
global positioning system to provide reports of vehicle position through latitude and 
longitude readings.  A terrestrial-based communications link is similar except that it is 
land-based and allows for two-way communications.  Each system generates a message 
showing vehicle position upon automatic request generated from the dispatch computer.  
Such requests can be generated as often as desired.   
b. Digital Pone without GPS 
Special cellular wireless telephone handsets using Binary Runtime 
Environment for Wireless (BREW) technology permit dispatch and the driver to 
communicate.  Dispatch can transmit integrated work order assignments to a driver and 
the driver can respond with status messaging.  If the driver accepts the assignment, then 
the details are provided.  After assignment, drivers can use one of five macros to report 
progress.  Those macros are accept/reject assignment, arrived, started, stopped, and 
departed. 
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This system was assessed by the management of a single trucking 
company and determined to be a viable technology.  However, no actual test was 
performed since the company who was supposed to test the devices could not 
accommodate the phones into their daily operational processes.  Additionally, specific 
comments were offered to improve the device.  Those comments were as follows. 
• The display was too small 
• The menu button was very hard to navigate, even after training 
• Cellular coverage was spotty once the trucks left the highway 
• The battery life of the phones was short and required them to be plugged 
into the charger most of the time 
• The phones lacked GPS capability that would be useful to help validate 
the information being transmitted 
Additional concerns may include the following. 
• The driver can easily lose the phone 
• Messaging required an active response where the dispatcher and driver 
had to initiate the action.  Dispatchers or drivers could forget to send a 
message or consider it to be too time-consuming or difficult.  Failure to 
generate required messages invalidates the system’s usefulness. 
• Even if all messages were sent as required, in the event of an emergency, 
dispatch had no control over the actual vehicle 
c. Panic Buttons 
Panic buttons allow a driver to send a panic message either via satellite or 
terrestrial communications system.  Some remote systems even allow the driver to 
disable the vehicle.  These systems are usually deployed in one of two ways; either the 
system is mounted inside the vehicle or via a wireless panic button carried by the driver.  
The wireless system studied operates within a distance of 250 feet from the vehicle. 
This technology was well accepted by the motor carriers participating in 
the test.  The technology worked well and was effective in providing notification of an 




participants were already using panic buttons for their trucks and expressed excellent 
satisfaction with this technology.  Additionally, certain defense and munitions carriers are 
already required to use these systems.   
In some cases, panic buttons were paired with remote vehicle disabling 
available to the driver.  The driver held a key fob with a button that allowed him to 
remotely disable the vehicle at a range of 250 feet.  This technology also worked well and 
was received enthusiastically by drivers because control was put in their hands.  The only 
drawback to this technology was that some drivers feared accidentally bumping the key 
fob and activating an alert.  This issue could be resolved through the design of the key 
fob itself.   
d. Global Login 
On-board software enables global login technology that requires the driver 
to enter a user ID and password in order to operate the truck.  The information is verified 
within the truck and remotely through a wireless communication system.  If the login is 
accepted, the driver can use the truck.  If the login fails, notice is sent to the dispatcher 
who can decide what action to take.  One option is to remotely disable the truck. 
Test results showed that this technology worked well and did not impede 
operations.  On average, it took a driver 33 seconds to log into the system.  The only 
drawback noted was that this system may be a burden to drivers who make multiple 
stops.  The test carriers stated that biometric login may be more convenient than global 
login technology.  Additional potential drawbacks include a driver forgetting his login ID 
and/or password. 
e. Biometric Global Login 
Biometric global login is similar to the global login system.  In place of 
requiring a user ID and a password to start the truck, this technology requires the driver 
to possess a smart card and scan a fingerprint.  This system operates through an on-board 
central processing unit run by proprietary firmware.  Unlike the global login, there is no 
necessary link to the dispatcher. 
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The biometric login concept appealed to many carriers.  Unfortunately, it 
exhibited many drawbacks upon actual testing.  This technology required specific 
placement of fingers on a consistent basis to obtain accurate readings.  Fingers that were 
either too hot or too cold could not be read.  These issues caused a great deal of driver 
frustration and complaints.  While logins took about 45 seconds to 1 minute to complete, 
many frustrated drivers stopped using the biometric login and opted for the global login 
feature as a more reliable back up.  Additional concerns are that the biometric reader also 
requires that the driver use a smart card that the driver could lose and thus would make 
the biometric login inoperable.  Also, while this technology prevents unauthorized users 
from starting a truck, once the truck is started, the dispatcher has no knowledge of its 
whereabouts and has no control over the vehicle. 
f. Electronic Supply Chain Manifest 
The electronic supply chain manifest is a system using several 
technologies to accomplish its task of tracking and maintaining a chain of custody for 
hazmat transport vehicles.  This system relies upon biometric verification, smart cards, 
Internet applications and on-board wireless communications.  To operate the system, a 
shipper using biometric systems and smart card technology logs in and creates an 
electronic manifest and identifies a load assignment.  Once complete, the manifest is 
shipped to a central server.  All authorized users then log into a centralized database to 
access this manifest.  This combination of steps allows the computer to generate a chain 
of custody for the shipment. 
This technology has the potential to offer several benefits to its users.  It 
provides the precise commodity description and quantity for the dispatcher.  Customer 
inquiries could be easily addressed.  It could reduce paperwork errors and processing 
times since all members of the supply chain would use a single database.  It could reduce 
the accounts receivable cycle by allowing simultaneous invoice creation with delivery 
confirmation.  It could even help law enforcement or emergency response personnel in 
the case of an emergency because the dispatcher would have information about the 
contents of the truck.   
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Unfortunately, this technology suffers from some substantial drawbacks.  
First, all members of the supply chain must purchase and be plugged into the same 
interface in order to make this technology useful.  Also, all who are plugged in would 
have to use the system correctly and consistently.  Because there are too many different 
stakeholders involved in the process, during the test, the technology was not used or was 
not used correctly in many cases.  The effectiveness of this technology requires a high 
level of attention and that appears to be unrealistic when dealing with numerous partners.  
An additional drawback from a security perspective is that even if used properly, this 
technology does not provide any mapping or control of the vehicle to the dispatcher.  
Thus if the truck is stolen, it would be difficult to locate and could not be shut down 
remotely. 
g. Intelligent On-Board Computers Initiating Remote Vehicle 
Disabling 
The on-board computer is designed to work in conjunction with the 
wireless communications/vehicle operating systems.  In the event of a security breach, 
the vehicle could be disabled in one of several ways.  One technique is to block fuel to 
the engine.  Another is to send instructions wirelessly to the vehicle’s data bus, 
instructing it to throttle down.  In this study, the on-board computer was also instructed to 
shut down the vehicle if there was a loss of satellite signal strength due to cut cables or 
blocked signal.  An alternative was to allow for local vehicle disabling whereby the 
driver would use a wireless remote panic button that would send a signal to initiate the 
disablement.  The local vehicle disabling does not require the use of the on-board 
computer to disable the vehicle.   
This technology was well received although participants expressed some 
reservations about shutting down a vehicle in the normal stream of traffic.  They did say 
that it was an option in emergency situations, however.  Participants expressed doubt that 
this technology would be approved for use in the real world due to these concerns.   
 39
h. Internal Trailer Door Locking System 
An internal trailer door locking system provides access control to a remote 
dispatcher.  Once a driver has reached a predetermined destination and is ready to deliver 
the contents of a cargo trailer, he contacts dispatch to request that the doors be unlocked.  
The dispatcher can then send an over-the-air signal to the trailer and unlock the doors.  
The driver receives a signal on the dashboard of the cab informing him when the signal 
has been received and the doors can be opened.  The driver then has 20 seconds to open 
the doors before the process must be restarted. 
This technology worked excellently during testing.  It performed as 
specified and even comes with some additional safeguards.  The design of the locking 
mechanism makes it difficult for the doors to be pried open by an unauthorized party.  
Additionally, if the doors are pried open, the system generates a tamper message and 
sends it to the network management center.   
i. External Electronic Seal 
An external electronic seal is a device attached to a seal on the outside of a 
trailer that automatically generates a short-range alert via wireless communication if the 
device is compromised without proper authorization.  The signal is transmitted to an on-
board wireless communications device that transmits a signal through a web-based 
application to the dispatcher.   
This technology proved ineffective in real-world tests.  Training was 
difficult due to the complexity of the technology and the many steps required to operate 
the seal.  It took drivers several minutes to complete the cycle of assigning and locking an 
e-seal.    Additionally, attempts to communicate with the seal from the cab of the truck to 
the back of the rear doors of the trailer were unsuccessful.  It appeared that the signal was 
not strong enough to operate on newer more rigid trailers.  Therefore, the e-seal did not 
prove to be operationally feasible.  Additional issues are that this technology, if effective, 
could only notify a dispatcher if a seal was broken.  It provides no control over the 
unauthorized movement of a truck. 
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j. Geofencing 
An internet application allows a dispatcher to establish a specified route 
for operation and/or identify a specific risk area within which a truck is not allowed to 
operate.  The technology defining the area within which the truck may operate is referred 
to as an electronic fence or geofence. The dispatcher can monitor the truck’s route over 
the Internet.  If a truck leaves its designated path or enters a risk area, then pre-
established settings will notify the dispatcher of this event.   
Geofencing worked well in tests.  Minimal training was needed for a 
dispatcher to set a route on an Internet-based software package.  It was received 
positively by the company testing its use and was determined to be an excellent 
technology to locate a vehicle that was off route or in an undesirable area.  The testing 
participant noted that, besides security benefits, this technology might keep drivers from 
stopping for excessive periods of time at unauthorized locations.  There were some noted 
limitations to this technology.  During this test, a position signal was sent to the system 
only once every hour.  Thus, if a truck left its allotted zone after its last signal, it could be 
off track for a full hour before the next signal was sent generating an alert.  The signal 
interval can be shortened, but it increases the cost to the carrier.  Ultimately, the interval 
between signals comes down to a cost/benefit decision for users.  The preferred option 
would be for real-time notifications. 
k. Tethered Trailer Tracking 
Trailer connects and disconnects are monitored remotely by dispatchers 
using tethered trailer tracking.  Software generates a record of the date, time, and location 
of each connect or disconnect event and transmits that data to dispatch using satellite 
communications technology. 
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l. Untethered Trailer Tracking 
A wireless satellite tracking system was merged with geofencing 
capabilities in order to provide more geographic coverage by eliminating blackouts and 
dead zones. 
Users found both tethered and untethered trailer tracking to be useful 
technologies.  They liked to be able to detect trailer connects and disconnects and they 
also appreciated the ability to track an unconnected trailer as another authorized carrier 
moved it.  There were no problems reported with these systems. 
m. Overall Results 
The study measured the effectiveness of each type of technology 
individually and as combined with others in terms of their ability to reduce security 
vulnerabilities based on theft, diversion, interception of bulk fuel, less than load–high 
hazard, bulk chemicals, and truckload explosives.  The reduction in vulnerability 
achieved under the study was reported as a percentage of 100 where a score of 100 was a 
complete reduction in vulnerability.  Values from 0 to 10% were considered to be nil, 
values from 11% to 25% were considered to be low, values from 26% to 50% were 
considered to be medium, and values over 50% were considered to be a high reduction in 
vulnerability.126  The results are reported in the following tables. 
Results Chart Legend 
Description in Results Technology Type 
  
Wireless Communications Digital phone without GPS 
GPS Position Wireless satellite and terrestrial 
communications systems 
Panic Alert Panic buttons 
Driver ID Global login; biometric global login 
Vehicle Disabling Intelligent on-board computers initiating 
remote vehicle disabling 
Cargo Seals External electronic seal 
Cargo Door Locks Internal trailer door locking system 
PSRC Public sector reporting center 
ESCM Electronic supply chain manifest 
                                                 
126 Stock et al., Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test Volume 
II: Evaluation Final Report Synthesis, 53. 
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Percent Reduction in Vulnerability of Theft by Load Type 












Wireless Communications (WC) 23 17 19 17 
WC + GPS Position 26 24 27 20 
Panic Alert + (WC + GPS Position) 42 37 42 33 
Driver ID + (WC + GPS Position) 40 38 39 29 
Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS Position) 42 39 44 31 
Cargo Seals + (WC + GPS Position) NA 37 NA 29 
Cargo Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) NA 36 NA 29 
PSRC + (WC + GPS Position) 37 36 39 31 
ESCM + (WC + GPS Position) 41 39 39 29 
Panic Alert + Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS 
Position) 
52 47 52 40 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + (WC 
+ GPS Position) 
58 54 57 43 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + ESCM + (WC + GPS 
Position) 
57 53 55 42 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Seals + (WC + GPS Position) 
NA 53 NA 42 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) 
NA 52 NA 42 
 
Percent Reduction in Vulnerability of Diversion by Load Type 












Wireless Communications (WC) 14 13 11 11 
WC + GPS Position 16 15 14 13 
Panic Alert + (WC + GPS Position) 26 23 23 23 
Driver ID + (WC + GPS Position) 24 23 21 19 
Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS Position) 25 26 24 21 
Cargo Seals + (WC + GPS Position) NA 23 NA 19 
Cargo Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) NA 22 NA 19 
PSRC + (WC + GPS Position) 24 23 22 22 
ESCM + (WC + GPS Position) 24 24 21 19 
Panic Alert + Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS Position) 31 31 29 27 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + (WC + 
GPS Position) 
34 34 31 29 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + ESCM + (WC + GPS Position) 34 33 30 29 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Seals + (WC + GPS Position) 
NA 33 NA 28 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) 







Percent Reduction in Vulnerability of Interception by Load Type 












Wireless Communications (WC) 7 5 5 6 
WC + GPS Position 8 6 6 7 
Panic Alert + (WC + GPS Position) 12 8 9 12 
Driver ID + (WC + GPS Position) 11 8 8 9 
Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS Position) 11 9 10 10 
Cargo Seals + (WC + GPS Position) NA 8 NA 9 
Cargo Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) NA 8 NA 10 
PSRC + (WC + GPS Position) 12 9 10 11 
ESCM + (WC + GPS Position) 11 8 8 10 
Panic Alert + Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS Position) 14 11 12 14 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + (WC + 
GPS Position) 
15 12 13 14 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + ESCM + (WC + GPS Position) 15 11 12 14 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Seals + (WC + GPS Position) 
NA 11 NA 14 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) 
NA 11 NA 14 
 
Percent Reduction in Overall Vulnerability by Load Type and Technology 












Wireless Communications (WC) 15 13 12 11 
WC + GPS Position 17 16 16 12 
Panic Alert + (WC + GPS Position) 27 25 25 21 
Driver ID + (WC + GPS Position) 25 25 23 18 
Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS Position) 26 27 26 19 
Cargo Seals + (WC + GPS Position) NA 25 NA 18 
Cargo Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) NA 24 NA 18 
PSRC + (WC + GPS Position) 24 25 24 20 
ESCM + (WC + GPS Position) 25 26 23 18 
Panic Alert + Vehicle Disabling + (WC + GPS Position) 32 32 31 25 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + (WC + 
GPS Position) 
36 37 34 27 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + ESCM + (WC + GPS Position) 35 36 33 26 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Seals + (WC + GPS Position) 
NA 36 NA 26 
Panic Alert + Driver ID + Vehicle Disabling + Cargo 
Door Locks + (WC + GPS Position) 
NA 35 NA 26 
Table 1.   Overall Results 
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C. TSA ACTIONS 
While DOT focused on security as an integral part of its safety programs, TSA 
focused on security issues alone.  There are four programs run by TSA that specifically 
focus on the security of hazmat motor carriers.  Those are corporate security reviews, 
grant distribution, a truck tracking center pilot, and most recently the publication of 
voluntary security action items.  Unfortunately, TSA has not met with much success for 
any of these programs.   
1. Corporate Security Reviews 
In order to assess the risk to commercial motor carriers, TSA implemented a CSR 
program.  This program has three main goals: first to develop best practices for security 
through discussions with carriers and visits to their facilities, second to begin the 
collection of data that will allow TSA to assess security across the industry, and third to 
identify security gaps and opportunities for improvement.127  Within its first two years 
from November 2005 through November 2007, TSA had only conducted reviews of 40 
trucking companies.  This small number of reviews can be accounted for due to the small 
number of full-time staff TSA is able to allocate to this project.   
In an effort to revise the process, TSA partnered with the state of Missouri and 
FMCSA’s Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program to conduct additional CSRs.128  This 
partnership greatly improved TSA’s ability to collect data.  The Missouri inspectors 
focused primarily on small firms, which are the most common in the industry.  While 
hazmat carriers were only a part of the trucking companies surveyed, in an eleven-month 
period, Missouri was able to conduct 1,231 CSRs on trucking companies alone.129   
Missouri completed a report on their findings and concluded that their sample was 
not representative of the commercial vehicle industry in their state or of the industry 
nationwide.  However, of the results they did reach, they reported that motor carriers of 
                                                 
127 William Arrington, General Manager, TSA Highway and Motor Carrier Programs, interview by 
author, Arlington, VA, July 27, 2007. 
128 Anonymous government source. 
129 Ibid. 
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all types did not have extensive security procedures in place, smaller carriers had 
implemented few security measures, and hazmat carriers had implemented more security 
measures than others.130  Of note were the conclusions that, generally, larger firms scored 
higher than smaller firms and interstate carriers scored higher than intrastate carriers.131  
This data is important because half of all hazmat hauls occur intrastate,132 and 98% of the 
industry is made up of small businesses, 82% of which own fewer than seven trucks.133     
2. Security Grants 
To date, DHS has spent more than $60 million in grants targeted at trucking 
security.  The money was spent by TSA, which signed a cooperative agreement with the 
American Trucking Associations (ATA) to develop and run a program called Highway 
Watch.  The no-bid cooperative agreement began in fiscal year 2003 and was funded 
through a grant to ATA in excess of $26 million per year from TSA.  ATA was to 
provide the training, manage a Highway Watch call center, and promote the program.  
Training costs exceeded $8 million per year and program administration exceeded $9 
million per year.    
The program was designed to reach out to commercial truck and bus drivers, 
school bus drivers, highway maintenance crews, bridge and tunnel toll collectors, and 
others and recruit them as an additional layer of security for the nation’s highways.  The 
program’s primary goal is to prevent attacks by teaching highway professionals to avoid 
becoming a target for terrorists who would use large vehicles or hazardous cargoes as a 
weapon.  A secondary goal is to train highway professionals to recognize and report 
suspicious activity.134  This program provided the training and communications 
infrastructure necessary to accomplish its goal by preparing 400,000 transportation 
                                                 
130 Anonymous government source. 
131 Ibid. 
132 National Hazardous Material Commercial Vehicle Tracking System Study, 10. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Transportation Security Administration, “TSA Teams up with American Trucking Associations to 
Prevent and Respond to Terrorism,” (March 23, 2004), 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/press_release_0405.shtm (accessed July 29, 2008). 
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professionals to respond in the event they or their cargo become the target of a terrorist 
attack and to share valuable intelligence with TSA if they witness potential threats.   
In 2008, the Highway Watch agreement with ATA was not renewed and was 
instead awarded to a new firm, HMS Company of Alexandria, VA.  The DHS Inspector 
General, in charge of reviewing allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse is now reviewing 
the program and expenditures135 amid allegations that ATA spent more money on 
administration and marketing than it did on training.136  To date, all of TSA’s motor 
carrier grant money has been spent solely on this program.  No other direct grant money 
has been made available to hazmat carriers for the installation of security devices or the 
development of other trucking security programs. 
3. Truck Tracking Pilot 
As part of its plan to address hazmat motor carrier security issues, TSA, in 
conjunction with The University of Virginia Accelerated Master’s Program in Systems 
Engineering, deployed a Truck Tracking Center (TTC) Pilot Project in Buffalo, NY.  The 
pilot was designed to put truck-tracking technology to the test under real-world 
conditions.  It was launched in September 2005, and a final report on the program was 
published in 2008. 
The objective of the TTC study was to develop the operational concept and 
functional requirements for processing truck tracking signals to identify real and potential 
transportation security incidents and use such data to demonstrate likely cost and 
performance estimates for a national system.137  In short, the TTC was designed to serve 
as a management, monitoring, and prevention center for hazmat events.138  The results of 
the study highlight numerous difficulties for the implementation of a nationwide 
program. 
                                                 
135 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Administration of the Federal 
Trucking Industry Security Grant Program for FY 2004 and FY 2005 (October 29, 2007). 
136 Samuel Loewenberg, “Truckers Lose DHS Contract,” Politico, May 16, 2008, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10412.html (accessed September 12, 2008). 
137 Decision Support System for a National HAZMAT Truck Tracking Center, 12. 
138 Ibid., 14. 
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Almost immediately, challenges facing such a national program became apparent.  
While the study acknowledged that primarily small operators in the U.S. handle hazmat 
transportation,139 and companies with large fleets of 100 or more trucks account for less 
than 1% of the industry, TSA has been able to make progress installing tracking systems 
on trucks belonging to large operators, but acknowledged that it will have significant 
difficulty doing the same for small companies.140 
Nineteen months into the study, the following findings emerged.141 
• The TTC was receiving a huge volume of data142 
• TSA received data only once hourly, making it slow to respond to hazmat 
events and unable to anticipate incidents 
• The TTC was ill-equipped to manage the data in-flow even though the 
pilot includes a very small portion of current hazmat shipments 
These findings were far from what TSA believes it would need to claim a 
successful TTC program.  Ultimately, in the normative scenario, TSA would be able to 
rapidly collect data, enabling a rapid response to all hazmat events and prevent incidents 
through the use of risk profile development and geofencing,143 a technology solution that 
restricts a truck’s path of travel.  In order to accomplish these goals, on-truck 
communications units would have to be installed on 420,000 hazmat trucks 
nationwide.144   
The authors realized that if a TTC program were to be effective, they would have 
to find a way to filter the incoming data so that only the relevant material could trigger 
action.  Ultimately, if effective filtering were enabled, the center could serve four main 
purposes.145 
                                                 
139 More than 87% of the industry operates six or fewer trucks; Ibid., 10. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., 16. 
142 The report offers no quantitative data to support this finding. 
143 Geo-fencing consists of technology on board a truck that analyzes vehicle position data against 
restricted areas and can send an alert when the vehicle violates a restricted parameter. 
144 Decision Support System for a National HAZMAT Truck Tracking Center, 18, 39. 
145 Ibid., 20. 
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• disseminate information to first responders and facilitate interagency 
communication to mitigate risk in rescue and cleanup operations 
• generate simple heuristics for detection of irregular behavior in hazmat 
movement 
• aggregate and analyze data in the long term in order to gain insights into 
how to more safely transport hazardous materials 
• provide added value to the carrier and goods shipper by mitigating risk 
associated with hazmat, thereby reducing long-term operating costs 
Unfortunately, the study found that even if the data filtering issues could be 
resolved, the actionable data was not meaningful.  Therefore, it was concluded that the 
TCC was not effective as an incident monitoring and first response center.146 
An additional significant detriment to the capture of actionable data was the 
generation of false panic signals.  Such signals usually occur by accident, when a driver 
panics and overreacts to a situation or when the signal goes off due to a technical glitch.  
Over a period of one year, it was determined that the probability that a signal would be a 
false alarm was 99.37%.147  Unresolved, the false signal problem effectively crippled the 
TCC program.   
Due to these problems, even a simplified version of the TCC would not be 
feasible.  It would cost in excess of $3.5 million annually,148  while the bulk of the man-
hours would be spent responding to false panic alarms.149 Even worse, the proposed 
model would actually delay150 the normal emergency response time due to a process that 
incorporated additional steps between the call for help and dispatch. 
While the results of this study do not fare well for a national truck-tracking center 
until some issues are resolved, it does not nullify the benefits of using technology in 
different ways.  One possible alternative would be to encourage individual companies to  
 
                                                 
146 Decision Support System for a National HAZMAT Truck Tracking Center, 33. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., 40. 
149 Ibid., 41. 
150 The study does not quantify the length of the delay. 
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install technology on their trucks and then have their own dispatch center track and 
monitor for panic signals.  This model would severely reduce the truck-to-monitor ratio, 
so false alarms would be much less of a distraction. 
4. Security Action Items 
On July 16, 2008, TSA announced the publication of 23 recommended security 
action items (SAIs) for the transportation of hazardous materials on the nation’s 
highways.  According to TSA, the security action items have been divided into four 
categories 1) general security, 2) personnel security, 3) unauthorized access, and 4) en 
route security.  General security measures pertain to security threat assessments, security 
planning, protecting critical information, and awareness of industry security practices.  
Personnel security and unauthorized access refer to practices affecting the security of the 
motor carrier's employees, contracted employees, and its property.  En route security 
refers to the actual movement and handling of motor vehicles containing highway 
security-sensitive materials (HSSM).151  
A list of specific materials that qualify as HSSM is divided by TSA into tier 1 and 
tier 2 materials.  Generally, TSA is most concerned about explosives and inhalation 
hazard materials.  Items such as gasoline and propane, for example, do not make this list 
because if ignited, they do not cause a hazard as high as the level as those materials on 
the list.   
The first recommended action items apply to both tiers.  Items 17–23 apply only 
to tier 1 HSSM.  More specifically, the SAI categories include the following. 
A)  General security 
1. Security assessment and security plan requirements 
2. Awareness of industry security practices 
3. Inventory control process 
4. Business and security critical information 
                                                 
151 Transportation Security Administration, “Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM) Security 
Action Items (SAIs),” http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highway/hssm_sai.shtm (accessed September 
11, 2008). 
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B)  Personnel security 
5. Possession of a valid commercial drivers license hazardous 
materials endorsement 
6. Background checks for highway transportation sector employees 
other than motor vehicle drivers with a valid CDL with hazardous 
materials endorsement 
7. Security awareness training for employees 
C)  Unauthorized access 
8. Access control system for drivers  
9. Access control system for facilities incidental to transport 
D)  En route security 
10. Establish communications plan 
11. Establish appropriate vehicle security program 
12. Establish appropriate cargo security program to prevent theft or 
sabotage of cargo containers 
13. Implement a seal/lock control program to prevent theft or sabotage 
of cargo 
14. High alert level protocols 
15. Establish security inspection policy and procedures 
16. Establish reporting policy and procedures 
17. Shipment preplanning, advance notice of arrival, and receipt 
confirmation procedures with receiving facility 
18. Preplanning routes 
19. Security for trips exceeding driving time under the hours of service 
of drivers regulation 
20. Dedicated truck 
21. Tractor activation capability 
22. Panic button capability 
23. Tractor and trailer tracking systems 
These SAIs apply only to HSSM carriers152 and their adoption is strictly 
voluntary.  TSA tells carriers that “no one solution fits all motor carriers and 
                                                 
152 Materials that are considered to be HSSM are generally explosives and those that are toxic 
inhalation hazards.  The specific list is not available for public dissemination. 
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circumstances.  These security action items allow for flexibility in implementation based 
upon the assessed vulnerability of a particular process or operation.  Where appropriate, 
implementation of these action items to their fullest extent practicable should be the goal 
of the affected owner and operator.”153  However, any owner or operator who chooses to 
comply with some or all of these recommendations, while potentially more secure, will 
receive no governmental benefit or recognition for compliance.  There is no method in 
place by which TSA can monitor industry response other than through voluntary 
feedback provided by the industry. 
D. SUMMARY  
Congress, DOT, and TSA have all been working on the issue of hazmat carrier 
security, but success remains elusive.  Current projects are focused primarily on HSSMs, 
a dangerous but very small portion of the hazmat motor carrier industry.  Primarily, 
achievements focus on background checks for hazmat vehicle drivers and security 
education programs.  There has been almost no progress made in securing non-HSSM or 
smaller carriers.  Technology solutions exist and are proven, but due to a combination of 
factors including expense, perceived lack of need, lack of government grants, and lack of 
requirement or incentive, these solutions are rarely employed.  Additionally, data 
collection and truck tracking projects have not yet met with any meaningful success.   
                                                 
153 John Sammon to Highway and Motor Carrier Stakeholders, letter dated June 26, 2008, 2. 
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VI. GAP ANALYSIS 
A. IDENTIFIED GAPS 
Seven years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States government has made little 
progress in securing the 800,000 daily trips made by hazardous materials trucks on our 
nation’s highways.  Attempts to address the issue have been made, but progress has been 
slow.  The issues are not easy and TSA is working to address the problems.  After 
analyzing the salient programs and their reported results, we can posit six major gaps in 
current policy.  First, there is no plan to further address security issues of hazmat carriers 
of non-HSSM materials.  Second, TSA recently published a list of 23 security action 
items but has provided no requirement or incentive to encourage their use.  Third, the 
government has failed to maintain any meaningful statistics related to hazmat carriers.  
Fourth, despite tens of millions of dollars spent in grant money, the use of the funds is 
being investigated and none of it has been spent on security technology.  Fifth, despite 
calls from the President and the Assistant Administrator for TSA, state, local, and tribal 
governments, as well as the private sector, have not been significantly included in the 
security process.  Sixth, the few regulatory processes that have been put in place have 
proven to be duplicative and unnecessarily burdensome on the industry. 
1. Non-HSSM Haulers 
TSA has focused its security efforts on hazmat truckers hauling what it classifies 
as highway security-sensitive hazardous materials.  TSA determined these to be the most 
important risk because of the breadth of the harm they can cause. Applying the classic 
formula for risk R=TVC, where R is risk, T is threat, V is vulnerability, and C is 
consequence, TSA has made the determination that risk is highest for these materials.  
Unfortunately, history and data clearly point to a different conclusion.  Applying the 
formula, the consequences of an attack using HSSM materials is very high, but the threat 
and vulnerability may actually be low since many of the companies hauling these HSSM  
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materials may already be exercising good security practices due to their own fears of 
liability.  If the vulnerability is reduced due to company action, the threat may also be 
reduced for fear of the security measures that may exist. 
Alternatively, non-HSSM haulers may be at higher risk for a terror attack.  A 
simple survey of terrorist attacks using hazmat trucks worldwide demonstrates a 
propensity for terrorists to use smaller or more readily accessible hazmat loads.  In recent 
years there have been many attacks using small non-HSSM loads of chlorine gas in 
cylinders, gasoline tankers, and others.  Therefore, a revisit of the risk formula shows that 
this threat is certainly viable given worldwide experience.  The vulnerability is higher as 
these non-HSSM materials are more plentiful and have minimal security requirements.  
The consequences of the threat, while not as large as HSSM materials, would still cause 
significant damage both physically and psychologically, especially if multiple such 
attacks using these materials were to occur. 
2. Security Action Items 
In June 2008, TSA issued a set of 23 voluntary security action items aimed only at 
HSSM carriers.  Unfortunately, TSA provided no assistance or incentives for a hazmat 
carrier to adopt these items.  Add to that the fact that TSA claims that these items may 
eventually become regulation and hazmat haulers are understandably afraid to act 
because they may expend funds to adopt their version of compliance and then find that an 
actual regulation requires something different.  This would turn their security investment 
into a financial loss.   
3. Statistics 
The government has failed to keep statistics on hazmat security events.  There is 
no national database and no known state databases containing any of this type of 
information.  While it may be possible to cobble some data together by researching FBI 
and individual state law enforcement statistics, the data would be difficult to find.  There 
is no definition of what data would qualify as a security event, no specific code used to 
identify it in a database, and no specific place for this type of data to be stored.  Since 
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hazmat carriers are neither asked nor required to report this data to any central office, 
TSA is hampered in identifying trends exhibiting the need for particular security action.  
Additionally, even with the launch of the new SAIs, TSA has not introduced any 
mechanism to account for data collection.  There is no way to determine which carriers 
may be voluntarily complying with the program or any issues or trends that may evolve. 
4. Grant Money 
TSA has spent over $60 million in grant money solely for the Highway Watch 
program.  It has not used any of this money to issue any other motor-carrier-security-
related grants.  Even if the program operated flawlessly and was highly successful, the 
best result would be that commercial truck and bus drivers, school bus drivers, highway 
maintenance crews, bridge and tunnel toll collectors, and others would be trained to look 
for security-related issues and report them to a call center.  While this is a noble goal, it is 
highly probable that in today’s security-conscious environment, these people and more 
are already conditioned to pick up their cell phone and dial 9-1-1 if they see something 
suspicious.  TSA grant money can be better used to support the purchase and use of 
security technology that has a direct and meaningful payback.  Such security technology 
most likely will not otherwise be put into use, especially by the smaller, more vulnerable 
carriers because of its expense. 
5. Inclusiveness 
Despite encouragement from the highest levels, state, local, and tribal 
governments, as well as the private sector, have been virtually left out of the security 
process.  Each of these is an important partner in security and their knowledge, skills, and 
abilities should be harnessed.  State, local, and tribal governments know their territory the 
best.  They know of threats prone to their unique circumstances and it is their local first 
responders who will show up and manage the scene if a terrorist incident involving 




industry trade associations, the insurance industry, security technology companies, 
hazmat carriers, and more, can make valuable contributions if they are brought into the 
process. 
6. Duplicative Regulatory Requirements 
Due to the checkered processes by which government security regulations have 
evolved, there exists a web of unnecessary requirements for the industry.  As an example, 
a single driver who wishes to legally haul hazardous materials must have his background 
checked once to obtain a hazmat endorsement to his driver’s license, again to obtain a 
TWIC card, and a third time to obtain FAST approval.  This is government bureaucracy 
at its worst.   
B. SUMMARY 
The six gaps in the hazmat security framework leave America vulnerable to 
terrorist attack.  These very same gaps, however, present tremendous opportunity for 
TSA to build a strong and successful security framework.  Simply by evaluating the 
factors necessary to fill these gaps and benchmarking with other successful public and 
private sector programs, TSA can develop and launch a security program that uses its 
existing resources, fosters any positive momentum, and builds a nationwide community 
of supportive participants. 
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VII. PRIVATE SECTOR PROGRAMS 
Even before 9/11 and especially since that time, the hazardous materials industry 
has been proactive in enhancing its own security requirements.  Two excellent examples 
of industry self-rule are the Responsible Care® program developed by the ACC and the 
Responsible Distribution ProcessSM developed by the NACD.   
A. RESPONSIBLE CARE® 
All ACC members as well as all partner companies must fully comply with the 
elements of the Responsible Care® program as verified by an independent auditor within 
strict timelines.  Any members or partners who do not comply will lose their ACC status.   
ACC carefully tracks its members’ implementation of the program’s Security 
Code and publicly discloses their performance.154  Since September 11, 2001, 
Responsible Care® companies have invested more than $6 billion to enhance security at 
their facilities.155  The Security Code, which addresses facility, cyber, and transportation 
security, requires companies to conduct comprehensive security vulnerability 
assessments of their facilities, implement security enhancements, and obtain independent 
verification that those enhancements have been made.  It also requires companies to 
create security management systems that include thirteen required management practices.  
Those requirements are as follows. 
• Senior leadership commitment to continuous improvement through 
published policies, provision of sufficient and qualified resources, and 
established accountability 
• Prioritization and periodic analysis of potential security threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences using accepted methodologies 
• Development and implementation of security measures commensurate 
with risks and taking into account inherently safer approaches to process 
design, engineering and administrative controls, and prevention and 
mitigation measures 
                                                 
154 American Chemistry Council, “Responsible Care.”  
155 American Chemistry Council, “Responsible Care Security Code.”  
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• Recognition that protecting information and information systems is a 
critical component of a sound security management system 
• Documentation of security management programs, processes, and 
procedures 
• Training, drills, and guidance for employees, contractors, service 
providers, value chain partners, and others, as appropriate, to enhance 
awareness and capability 
• Communications, dialogue, and information exchange on appropriate 
security issues with stakeholders such as employees, contractors, 
communities, customers, suppliers, service providers, and government 
officials and agencies balanced with safeguards for sensitive information 
• Evaluation, response, reporting, and communication of security threats as 
appropriate 
• Evaluation, response, investigation, reporting, communication, and 
corrective action for security incidents 
• Audits to assess security programs and processes and implementation of 
corrective actions 
• Third-party verification that, at chemical operating facilities with potential 
off-site impacts, companies have implemented the physical site security 
measures to which they have committed 
• Evaluation and management of security issues associated with changes 
involving people, property, products, processes, information, or 
information systems 
• Continuous performance improvement processes entailing planning, 
establishment of goals and objectives, monitoring of progress and 
performance, analysis of trends, and development and implementation of 
corrective actions 
ACC has determined that only members and partners who comply with all of 
these management practices may remain members and partners and can claim compliance 
with Responsible Care®.  Partners have found that there are additional business-related 
benefits to belonging to ACC and complying with the Responsible Care® requirements.  
Those benefits are as follows. 
• Promotes increased action and interaction between members and partners 
• Fosters consistent terminology and streamlines communications 
throughout the chemical industry 
• Improves dialogue with communities and other stakeholders about the safe 
handling of chemical products 
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ACC has worked hard to keep its program robust.  In addition to its demand for 
strict adherence to program requirements, ACC supports the program by permitting use 
of its Responsible Care® logo to qualified companies, hosts an annual Responsible 
Care® leadership awards program, holds monthly teleconferences with its members and 
partners, and hosts an annual conference and exposition.156 
B. RESPONSIBLE DISTRIBUTION PROCESSSM 
The Responsible Distribution ProcessSM (RDP) is an initiative of the NACD and 
its member companies designed to provide a system that promotes continuous 
improvement in the environmental, health, safety, and security performance of all 
member companies.  It is designed to be sensitive and responsive to community needs 
and public concerns.  The senior executive of each member company signs acceptance of 
the Guiding Principles and Code of Management Practice as a condition of 
membership.157 
RDP enumerates eight specific guiding principles by which member companies 
pledge to manage their business.158  Those guiding principles are as follows. 
• To recognize and respond to community concerns about chemicals, their 
handling, and transportation 
• To make health, safety, security, and environmental considerations a 
priority in our planning for all existing and new operations, products, 
processes, and facilities 
• To inform emergency response officials, employees, customers, and the 
public of manufacturer information on chemical-related health or 
environmental hazards and the manufacturer’s recommendations on 
protective measures 
• To work with customers, in accordance with manufacturer’s 
recommendations, on product stewardship including handling, use, 
transportation, and disposal of chemical products 
                                                 
156 American Chemistry Council, “Responsible Care Toolkit,” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_rctoolkit/index.asp (accessed October 22, 2008). 
157 Responsible Distribution Process Code Coordinator Manual 2008 (Arlington, VA: National 
Association of Chemical Distributors, 2008), 3. 
158 Ibid., 5. 
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• To operate our plants and facilities in a manner that protects the health and 
safety of our employees, the public, and the environment 
• To cooperate in resolving problems created by past handling and disposal 
of hazardous chemicals 
• To participate with government and others in creating responsible laws, 
regulations, and practices to help safeguard the community, workplace, 
and environment 
• To promote the principles and practices of RDP by sharing experiences 
and offering assistance to others who produce, handle, use, transport, or 
dispose of chemicals 
In addition to these eight Guiding Principles, the RDP maintains a twelve-part 
Code of Management Practice.159  The categories outlining those practices are the 
following. 
• risk management 
• compliance review and training 
• carrier selection 
• handling and storage 
• job procedures and training 
• waste management and conservation practices 
• emergency response and public preparedness 
• community outreach 
• product stewardship 
• internal RDP audits 
• RDP corrective and preventive action 
• RDP document and data control 
Each NACD member must prove its compliance with the RDP program.  It does 
this by submitting to an independent third-party verification review.  The verifier reviews 
a completed company profile, RDP questionnaire, and a self-assessment report.  The third 
party also verifies the existence of company policies and procedures that are consistent  
 
                                                 
159 Responsible Distribution Process Code Coordinator Manual 2008. 7. 
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with the spirit and intent of the RDP Code of Management Practice.160  If a party does 
not obtain a favorable review, and does not correct any deficiencies, it will lose its 
membership.   
In order to maintain a robust program, RDP holds twice-annual RDP Code 
Coordinator Workshops, peer-to-peer networking opportunities, publicly reports 
performance data, and presents an annual RDP Excellence Award for demonstrated 
outstanding performance of a company’s RDP program based on the findings of NACD’s 
two independent verification firms.  Each of these incentives encourages member 
companies to maintain the highest standards.  If a company does not comply, it will lose 
its NACD membership. 
C. SUMMARY 
The private sector felt the need to fill the gap left by the government in the 
security arena through its trade associations. Both of the cited programs are voluntary, 
rigorous, open, and supported by independent verification.  Participants appreciate the 
value of the designation and this spurs the free market when they seek to do business only 
with other participants.  When participants demand of their business chain the same 
adherence to rigorous security standards, those companies who do not comply can find 
themselves losing market share.  Overall, the industry benefits because the better 
managed and more secure companies grow stronger while the less secure competitors 
wither away. 
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VIII. GOVERNMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAM MODELS 
A. GOVERNMENT STAR PROGRAMS 
An interesting phenomenon, referred to herein as the Star Effect, is beginning to 
emerge within government.  Federal agencies are beginning to realize the value of 
public/private partnerships and develop beneficial programs by working with, rather than 
against market forces.  A typical traditional approach to addressing issues used to be, and 
remains so today in many cases, that a problem was identified, the government developed 
its proposed response to fix that problem, and then set out on the lengthy and arduous 
path of developing regulations to require private sector compliance.  This led to 
protracted regulation drafting processes, court battles, and, if the regulation was 
published, to exhaustive and expensive inspection and enforcement operations. 
The fact remains that if industry does not embrace regulatory compliance, they 
may seek to meet the bare minimum level of compliance that will keep them from 
suffering a fine.  Others will hedge their bets and ignore the regulation hoping not to get 
caught.  It is safe to say that no industry will ever have any reason to put more money 
into regulatory compliance than necessary if they do not perceive any other value to their 
company.  In essence, the metaphor for regulatory programs is pushing a boulder up a 
hill.  No matter how much effort is exerted, if that effort is not continuously exerted, the 
natural tendency is for that boulder to roll backwards.  
The metaphor for the Star Effect, on the other hand, is that of a boulder rolling 
down a hill while the government carefully manages its speed and direction.  The 
government invites voluntary public/private partnerships where all parties together define 
the program and its goals.  In the end, the government has an ever-growing number of 
partners who understand the benefits of participation in the program, and the government 
continues to assist the effort by sweetening the pot for those who participate.   
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Two examples of the Star Effect are the Energy Star program developed jointly 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) and the OSHA Star program that is part of the OSHA’s Voluntary Protection 
Programs (VPP). 
1. Energy Star 
The EPA launched the Energy Star program in 1992 as a voluntary labeling 
program designed to identify and promote energy-efficient products to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.  The initial product categories were computers and computer monitors.  
Eventually the program expanded to additional office products and residential heating 
and cooling equipment.  In 1996, EPA partnered with DOE to add additional product 
categories.  The program now covers major appliances, office equipment, lighting, home 
electronics, new homes, and commercial and industrial buildings.  It has also developed 
partnerships with more than 12,000 private and public sector organizations.161 
In general, Energy Star works by dismantling identifiable and pervasive market 
barriers responsible for stifling investment in energy efficiency and by bringing practical 
solutions to the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors.  Ultimately, businesses 
and consumers save money through lower utility bills and the government obtains lower 
greenhouse emissions, a reduced need to generate energy, improved energy 
independence, and security, as well as helping to grow the economy. 
Through its programmatic efforts, more than 70% of the American public can 
identify the Energy Star label today.  In 2007 alone, Americans purchased 500 million 
Energy Star qualified products across more than 50 product categories; more than 
120,000 new homes were constructed to meet the guidelines, and states and localities 
have partnered with the program to offer benefits to local homeowners.162   
                                                 
161 U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, “History of Energy Star,” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_history (accessed July 23, 2008). 
162 U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency, “Energy Star Overview of 2007 
Achievements,” http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/2007%20CPPD%204pg.pdf 
(accessed October 22, 2008). 
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The EPA states that the program’s success is due, in part, to common market 
conditions surrounding energy efficiency.  The program is designed to overcome market 
barriers and encourage the adoption of cost-effective energy efficiency products and 
services in a sustained manner and to help unleash the attendant savings for individuals 
and organizations.  To do this, EPA does not fund the purchase of equipment, products, 
or services.  Instead, it uses its funds to provide consumers and businesses with 
information and tools to break down major market barriers and alter decision making for 
the long term.  This approach helps drive private capital toward energy efficiency 
investments and provides environmental and economic payback for the government’s 
investment. 
Energy Star remains relevant and successful in part due to its following attributes. 
• market-based approach 
• benefits for all parties 
• voluntary nature 
• public/private partnerships 
• corporate- and citizen-based pledge and involvement 
• inclusive nature 
• branding 
• effective national campaign 
• annual awards program 
• openness 
• willingness to embrace international partnerships 
2. OSHA Star 
The U.S. Department of Labor through its OSHA arm launched VPP in 1982 
modeled after an experimental program in California begun in 1979.  The VPP program 





development of voluntary public/private cooperation that fosters relationships between 
management, labor, and OSHA.  To date, the average VPP worksite has a days away, 
restricted, or transferred case rate of 52% below the average for its industry.163 
VPP sets performance-based criteria for managed safety and health systems, 
invites sites to apply, and assesses applicants against program criteria.  The verification 
process includes an application review and a rigorous on-site evaluation by a team of 
OSHA safety and health experts.164  Applicants can be approved into one of three 
possible programs: Star, Merit, or Star Demonstration. 
• Star - The Star program is the elite of the three designations.  It is reserved 
for exemplary worksites with comprehensive, successful safety and health 
management systems.  A company must demonstrate an injury and illness 
rate at or below the national average in its industry.  These sites prove they 
are self-sufficient in their ability to control safety and health issues at their 
workplace.  Incident rates are reviewed annually, but participating 
companies are only reevaluated every three to five years.  
• Merit - Merit is designed as a stepping stone to the Star designation.  Merit 
companies have good safety and health programs, but they are still in need 
of some improvement before they can be considered excellent.  These 
companies are judged to have the desire and real potential to achieve star 
quality performance in three years.  Merit companies are evaluated on-site 
every 18–24 months.  They are entitled to one three-year term to reach star 
status unless the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and 
Health approves a second three-year term.   
• Star Demonstration - Companies that have achieved Star status may 
choose to test alternatives to the current Star eligibility and performance 
requirements.  This allows for and encourages innovation in the industry.  
Programs that show promise or have proven to be successful may result in 
changes to the Star requirements. 
OSHA has also introduced three additional programs: the OSHA Challenge, VPP 
Corporate, and VPP Construction programs. 
• OSHA Challenge - OSHA challenge can be considered an equivalent to a 
set of training wheels designed to guide, assist, and challenge companies 
to improve their performance so they can graduate to Merit or Star levels 
of performance.  The Challenge program lays out a series of incremental 
steps a company can follow to develop and implement effective safety and 
                                                 
163 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “All About VPP.” 
164 Ibid. 
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health management systems.  Each step of the process requires certain 
action, documentation, and outcomes related to VPP criteria.  Participants 
receive recognition at the completion of each stage.   
• VPP Corporate - While the VPP program was successful, companies with 
multiple facilities were still required to submit new applications for each 
of its locations.  The VPP Corporate program was designed to reduce 
these duplicative requirements.  The program is designed to eliminate the 
redundancy in the VPP application and onsite evaluation processes while 
maintaining the quality and integrity of the VPP program.  Through an 
application, a company can request acceptance into the VPP Corporate 
program and, if accepted, all of that company’s eligible facilities will 
follow a streamlined application and on-site evaluation process. 
• VPP Construction Program - America’s construction industry has unique 
needs when it comes to occupational safety and health.  OSHA recognizes 
this and has been evaluating pilot programs to develop alternative VPP 
criteria for construction employers.  The goal is to make VPP more 
accessible to construction employers, especially small employers. 
OSHA Star Benefits 
• Employers - Employers who earn VPP status reap the rewards of lower 
workplace injuries and illnesses as well as reduced oversight.  Their 
profits rise as their workers remain more productive and their worker’s 
compensation and insurance-related costs go down.  The positive benefits 
of the program tend to have a ripple effect and VPP sites evolve into 
models of excellence that influence practices industry-wide.   
• OSHA - The government benefits from the VPP programs as well.  OSHA 
reports that it gains a corps of ambassadors who enthusiastically spread 
the message of safety and health management.  These ambassadors also 
share valuable input into program improvements and augment its limited 
resources.  VPP companies require reduced oversight and resources due to 
reduced workplace injuries and a reduced potential for such injuries. An 
additional outgrowth from the program includes the emergence of a non-
profit advocacy group, the Voluntary Protection Program Participant’s 
Association.  This organization works closely with OSHA and states in the 
development and implementation of additional cooperative programs.  It 
also provides expertise by commenting and offering stakeholder feedback 
on agency rulemaking and policies and by providing testimony to 





OSHA Star remains relevant and successful in part due to its following attributes. 
• market-based approach 
• benefits for all parties 
• voluntary nature 
• public/private partnerships 
• corporate-based involvement 
• inclusive nature 
• branding 
• effective national campaign 
• rewards in the form of public praise 
• openness 
• willingness to support international inquiries 
B. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
The government routinely uses incentive-based programs to encourage certain 
behaviors and to shape social policy.  While the federal income tax system is often a 
source of frustration, the use of tax incentives has had, and continues to have, significant 
impact on personal and corporate fiscal practices.  A thorough review of the myriad of 
incentive programs would be a monumental task and is unnecessary for the issue at hand.  
Instead, four specific programs are good examples that can be used to further this 
discussion of hazmat motor carrier security programs.  The four programs are the 
National Park Service Historic Preservation Tax Incentives, the Virginia Enterprise Zone 
program, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)165 and its FAST 
program, and the Port Security Grant Program, which supports requirements of the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act. 
                                                 
165 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism,” 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/ (accessed September 12, 2008). 
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1. National Park Service Historic Preservation Tax Incentives 
The U.S. government encourages the preservation of historic buildings for many 
reasons.  Historic buildings are our link to the past and help give a community a sense of 
identity, stability, and orientation.166 One particular program makes federal tax incentives 
available to those who rehabilitate historic structures.167  The Federal Historic 
Preservation Tax Incentives program is one of the federal government’s most successful 
and cost-effective community revitalization programs.168  In addition to federal tax 
benefits, some states will increase the incentive by providing state tax benefits as well. 
In this program, the federal government has chosen to offer a 20% tax credit for 
certified rehabilitation of certified historic structures and a 10% tax credit for the 
rehabilitation of non-historic, non-residential buildings built before 1936.  It is important 
to note that owners are receiving a tax credit, not a tax deduction.  The difference is 
substantial.  Where a tax deduction lowers the amount of income subject to taxation, a tax 
credit lowers the amount of tax owed dollar for dollar.   
To obtain the tax credit, before they start work, owners must submit an 
application describing the rehabilitation projects they plan to complete and receive a 
certification decision that the plans fall within the requirements of the program.  Once the 
work is completed, the applicant must submit a request for certification of completed 
work along with a full accounting of the money spent on the project as independently 
verified in writing by a licensed accountant.  If all work meets program requirements and 
the applicant pays the requisite processing fees, then the program office will issue the 
paperwork necessary to claim the tax credit. 
                                                 
166 National Park Service, “Historic Preservation Tax Incentives,” 
http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/tax/index.htm (accessed September 12, 2008). 
167 Treasury Regulation Section 1.48-12. 
168 National Park Service, “Historic Preservation Tax Incentives.” 
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2. Virginia’s Enterprise Zone Program 
The state of Virginia established the Virginia Enterprise Zone Act169 in 1982 to 
encourage new business activity in specified geographic areas by providing state and 
local tax relief and grants, regulatory flexibility, and local infrastructure development.170  
Typically, an enterprise zone will be formed in an economically depressed area with few 
jobs and crumbling infrastructure.  The program seeks to spur private investment to 
rehabilitate structures and create new jobs by encouraging the opening of new businesses.  
To date, qualified enterprise zone applicants have created more than 39,000 jobs and 
spent more than $800 million in qualified investments within the enterprise zones.171   
The enterprise zone program is designed to complement other local, state, and 
federal economic development activities and is not intended as a stand-alone program.172  
In general, the state offers Job Creation grants and Real Property Investment grants.  The 
state will allocate a specific amount of grant funds for each fiscal year.  To be eligible for 
these funds, investors must apply for the program, follow the rules, and submit 
accounting records certified by an independent certified public accountant licensed in the 
state.  If all requirements are met, the applicant will receive a grant check reimbursing 
him for his qualified expenses.  If the sum total of qualified applicant spending exceeds 
the amount of grant funds allocated for that year, the funds will be distributed on a 
prorated basis.173 
3. Free and Secure Trade 
The governments of Canada and Mexico each worked with the U.S. Department 
of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to design a border accord initiative to ensure 
                                                 
169 Section 59.1-270 through 59.1-284 of the Code of Virginia. 
170 Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development, “Virginia Enterprise Zone 
Program,” 
http://www.dhcd.virginia.gov/CommunityDevelopmentRevitalization/Virginia_Enterprise_Zones.htm 
(accessed September 12, 2008). 
171 Ibid. 
172 Virginia Economic Development Partnership, “Virginia’s Enterprise Zone Program,” 
www.virginiaallies.org/pdf's/Articleonlocalenterprisezones.pdf (accessed September 12, 2008). 
173 Ibid. 
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security and safety while also enhancing each others’ economic prosperity.  Each country 
started with its own processes for clearing commercial shipments at the border with the 
United States and then developed the FAST program to streamline those processes so that 
freight could move more quickly between the countries.  The program is completely 
voluntary and addresses all phases of the commercial shipping process including 
commercial drivers, carriers, importers, and manufacturers.   
• Commercial Drivers - To participate in the FAST program, drivers must 
undergo a background check and be admissible to the U.S. and Canada. If 
approved, the driver is issued a FAST driver card that provides such 
benefits as expedited processing and the use of a dedicated FAST lane 
where available. 
• Approved Carriers - Carriers who participate in the FAST program can 
gain expedited clearance into the United States if they demonstrate a 
history of complying with all legislative and regulatory requirements, 
enter into an agreement with CBP, provide a completed security profile to 
CBP, and make a commitment to security-enhancing business practices as 
required by C-TPAT. 
• Approved Importers - Importers can take advantage of the FAST program 
if they develop a sound plan to enhance security procedures throughout 
their supply chain.  If an importer does not control a facility, conveyance, 
or process, they must make reasonable efforts to secure compliance by the 
responsible parties.  Importers must successfully pass a C-TPAT risk 
assessment before acceptance into the program. 
• Manufacturers - Manufacturers exporting to the United States from 
Mexico who pack and prepare their own materials for shipping in a facility 
that they own and control are eligible for C-TPAT approval. 
Manufacturers must successfully pass a C-TPAT risk assessment before 
acceptance into the program. 
• Program Benefits - FAST participants gain access to dedicated FAST 
lanes for clearance of trans-border shipments, are subject to a reduced 
number of examinations for continued compliance, and receive secondary 
priority processing.  These process efficiencies can add up to increased 
profits for participants.  The government also benefits through increased 
security assurances and the ability to preprocess participants so that it can 
allocate resources to higher risk cargo at border crossings. 
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4. Port Security Grants Program 
In 2003, DHS, through the United States Coast Guard (USCG), issued regulations 
supporting the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.174  Section 104 of these 
regulations establishes security requirements for maritime vessels.  In many respects, 
maritime vessels are similarly situated to highway motor carriers in that they are privately 
owned, rely on the use of governmental conveyances such as ports or roads, and are 
responsible for implementing their own security measures. While USCG issued vessel 
security requirements similar to what DOT has issued for motor carriers, USCG has 
supported the implementation of those requirements through its PSGP. 
The PSGP recognizes that the vast bulk of U.S. critical infrastructure is owned 
and/or operated by state, local, and private sector partners and that each port area has 
specific individual needs and tested experience about how best to reduce risk within their 
region.175 The grant investment strategy establishes two priorities: risk-based funding and 
regional security cooperation.176  Therefore, it makes federal funds available not only to 
governmental actors such as maritime terminals, facilities, port authorities, and other state 
and local agencies that provide layered security protection for federally regulated 
facilities, but also directly to federally inspected passenger vessels or stakeholders 
required to provide services as specified in a vessel security plan.177  
In order to receive funds, an application must be filed by a published cut-off date.  
Applications received will be reviewed according to port area for compliance with 
security plan requirements and funding priorities articulated by the government.  Next, a 
National Review Panel will convene to identify a prioritized list of projects for funding.  
This list will be run through a risk-based algorithm and returned to the National Review 
Panel for completion of a final ranked list from which funds distribution will be made.178   
                                                 
174 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295 (2002). 
175 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2008 Port Security Grant Program, Program 
Guidance and Application Kit (February 2008), 1. 
176 Ibid., 2. 
177 Ibid., 7–8. 
178 Ibid., 16–18. 
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In this model, public sector applicants are required to provide matching funds of 
at least 25% and private sector applicants must provide matching funds of at least 50%.  
Grant awards of $25,000 or less do not require matching funds.179  In this program, funds 
are allocated based on application and prior approval of a given project, not application 
and reimbursement after the fact.  This process, while fiscally responsible, does have one 
drawback, which is that it can cause a delay in security project implementation while 
paperwork is processed.   
C. SUMMARY 
There are virtually unlimited options available to the government to steer public 
policy and participation.  In a capitalistic market-driven economy, incentives through 
benefits work well.  Benefits range from monetary, such as tax incentives, credits, or 
grants, to non-monetary means, such as faster processing or less oversight.  Each of these 
options can be employed in multiple ways.  Monetary benefits can be pre-approved, 
reimbursed after the fact, or show up as tax incentives or grants.  They also can be used to 
stretch the government’s budget dollars by requiring some form of direct or indirect 
matching funds from private investors.  Most government programs can be improved 
when driven by incentive-based options.   
                                                 
179 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 20. 
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IX. SOLUTION 
A. SECURITY THROUGH ASSESSED RISK (STAR) PROGRAM 
Hawley supports a risk-based approach to security.180  He applies this approach to 
new initiatives181 and when revisiting old problems.182  A risk-based approach essentially 
requires first that one assess the risk associated with a particular security issue and then 
craft a response tailored to address the higher risks first.  If developed, a TSA STAR 
program could apply a risk-based model to the hazmat carrier security issue in a way that 
fills gaps.  While no answer can be perfect, the STAR program as proposed allows TSA 
to provide for a reasonable degree of security through individually tailored risk reduction 
programs.   
Small intrastate companies hauling flammable liquids and liquefied gases are 
arguably at high risk for exploitation by terrorists.  Current hazmat security programs 
offer little protection for these carriers.  Therefore, it is important to develop a security 
program that does not require increased cost or staffing for government or industry and 
that can be implemented rapidly.183  The STAR program as proposed addresses all of 
these issues and more.  The program is voluntary but provides that certain rigorous 
requirements be met to earn the STAR status. 
B. REQUIREMENTS TO EARN STAR STATUS 
Hazmat carriers transporting any type of hazardous materials will be encouraged 
to participate in the STAR program on a strictly voluntary basis.  To participate, the 
following will be required: 
                                                 
180 Transportation Security Administration, “Risk Management,” 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/risk/index.shtm (accessed October 22, 2008). 
181 Transportation Security Administration, “Where We Stand,” 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/where_we_stand/training.shtm (accessed October 22, 2008). 
182 Transportation Security Administration, “DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP),” 
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/customer/redress/index.shtm (accessed October 22, 2008). 
183 HSPD-7 requires rapidly implemented tactical security enhancements. 
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• Application - Each carrier must submit an application and receive written 
verification from TSA that they are eligible to participate in the STAR 
program. 
• Security Threat Assessment - Applicants must then contract with an 
independent consultant approved by TSA to conduct a security threat 
assessment of their operation, including drivers, vehicles, and facilities 
incidental to transport.  Such assessments can also be completed by state 
inspectors if TSA develops agreements with states to do so.  The 
consultant will follow guidelines established by TSA184 and will draft a 
report noting any security deficiencies and include recommendations to 
correct those deficiencies.  All deficiencies must be corrected before 
acceptance into the program.  An example of a requirement could be that a 
carrier with certain risks must install a panic alarm system in their trucks. 
• Background Check - Carriers must ensure that background checks on 
drivers and plant personnel are completed and up to date.  Background 
checks must meet the standards set by TSA.  Most personnel will already 
have gone through a background check, as it is a requirement to obtain a 
hazmat endorsement or TWIC card.  Only individuals with successful 
background checks will be afforded access to hazmats. 
• Security Training - All personnel will be required to complete security 
training designed for their particular type of operation.  This requirement 
will be a good way to start accomplishing the original goals of the 
Highway Watch program. 
• Insurance - All participants must maintain a specified amount of liability 
insurance or prove that they are successfully self-insured for that same 
amount.   
• Reporting - Participants will agree that as a condition of membership they 
will report any security incidents185 to TSA.  Reporting can be 
anonymous, but participants will have to sign an annual certification that 
they have reported all security incidents that have occurred over the 
previous year.  This allows TSA to begin to build a database that 
eventually can be useful in determining security trends and in assessing 
best practices. 
• Signed Pledge - The CEO of each carrier will be required to sign a pledge 
of support for the STAR program and display that document in an area 
viewable by all employees.  This reaffirms corporate support for the 
program. 
                                                 
184 TSA can readily establish these guidelines based on its current voluntary Security Action Items. 
185 TSA will need to provide guidance and a definition of a “security incident.” 
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• Independent Certification of Compliance - The independent individual 
conducting the security threat assessment must provide a signed document 
certifying that the particular carrier has complied with all elements of the 
program as the final step of the application process before a carrier can 
earn STAR status. 
• Bi-annual Recertification - Participants will be required to recertify their 
compliance every two years.  This maintains the integrity of the program. 
In order to encourage industry participation, TSA should not charge an 
application fee, although the option exists to charge a fee to offset the costs of program 
administration.  Carriers will not be exempt from any current processing fees, such as 
those required for background checks, and will also have to pay for the threat assessment 
and certification of compliance. 
C. BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS 
Those carriers who choose to participate in the program and who earn STAR 
status will be entitled to the following benefits of membership: 
• TSA STAR Contact Desk - Allocated TSA employees will be available to 
all participants to assist them with program compliance issues.   
• One Stop Background Checks - TSA will arrange for a single background 
check that will be sufficient for a hazmat driver’s license endorsement, 
TWIC card application, and the FAST program, as well as any future 
programs that require a background check.   
• Grants - Carriers who were required to spend money to purchase security 
equipment to comply with the requirements of a security threat assessment 
will be eligible to apply for TSA grant money.  This program can be 
administered in multiple ways.  Three suggestions are the following: 
• Direct reimbursement after the fact for installation of security 
devices whose installation was pre-approved by TSA.  All 
expenses up to a certain amount per truck will be fully 
reimbursable and any expenses beyond the predetermined amount 
will require a matching contribution from the carrier.  The 
certification of compliance will serve as a receipt and proof of 
installation. 
• Direct reimbursement for installation of security devices in a 
manner similar to the Enterprise Zone model.  A predetermined 
fund will be allocated each fiscal year to support the program.  All  
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applications for reimbursement will be due by a certain date and all 
successful applications will receive reimbursement from the fund 
in full or on a prorated basis based on the available funds.   
• Tax credits equal to a specified percentage of the cost to install 
security devices.  The credit can be for any amount from 1% to 
100% of the cost.  This option is a good option if TSA does not 
have direct grant funds available but the government makes a 
policy decision that offers a tax credit, which is an effective and 
desired way to encourage installation of security devices. 
A very effective tactic here under any option would be to reimburse only a 
percentage of costs.  This model effectively increases the overall amount of money spent 
on security and encourages the actual user to pay a portion of the bill.  This is a useful 
way to stretch TSAs security budget. 
• Insurance Discounts - Members could receive discounts on their insurance 
coverage for STAR compliance and earning preferred risk status.  
Alternatively, they could receive discounts equal to the amount they were 
required to pay for the security threat assessment and the certification of 
compliance.  This should be acceptable to insurance companies because, if 
a carrier earns STAR status, the insurer can be confident that they are 
purchasing a preferred risk.  This same model is already in place for 
members of the Responsible Distribution Process.SM  Members currently 
receive a discount on their insurance premiums equal to the amount of 
money they were required to pay to comply with the verification 
process.186  Additionally, insurance companies have already spoken with 
TSA about offering these discounts to carriers who practice security 
measures in line with TSA’s standards.187   
• STAR Security Panel Membership - Each STAR member will become a 
member of the state or federal (or both, depending on where they conduct 
their business) security panel.  These panels will be made up of colleagues 
and state and local officials and may choose to invite members of 
supporting communities when appropriate, such as the insurance industry 
or the security technology industry.  The panels will meet to discuss issues 
members have with federal, state, or local policies or programs and 
security issues relevant to their area and to share best practices.  This 
program starts to bring the state and local governments back into the 
process. 
                                                 
186 Mike Lang, PMP Director, Responsible Distribution Process, National Association of Chemical 
Distributors, interviewed by author. 
187 William Arrington, General Manager, TSA Highway and Motor Carrier Programs, interview by 
author, Arlington, VA: July 27, 2007. 
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• STAR Seal of Approval - Members can proudly display the STAR seal of 
approval and use the status to build their business.  Currently, members of 
the Responsible Distribution ProcessSM and the Responsible Care® 
programs report an increase in business from manufacturers and 
distributors who seek them out because they know they are doing business 
with responsible, secure partners.  This factor lowers liability concerns for 
all parties.  This single aspect of the STAR program will take advantage of 
free-market economics by decreasing business to non-members due to the 
desire of members to switch their business relationships to do business 
with other members.  This free-market effect will eventually drive non-
secure or less secure carriers to either step up to the plate and enhance 
their security or be marginalized. 
• Awards - Members will be eligible for one or more annual awards 
recognizing superior security practices.  Recognition from rewards 
programs is coveted by many and again is a good business builder.  A 
recent winner of a similar award from the Responsible Care® program 
reported an increase in employee morale when the employees realized that 
they belonged to an elite company.188 
• Secure Workforce - Once a carrier completes the requirements for 
membership, it can be confident that it employs a better-trained and more 
secure workforce.  This is likely to result in reduced negative incidents 
and thus reduced liability costs. 
• Individual Control - Carriers that adopt their own security measures and 
install their own security devices will maintain better and closer control of 
their security.  There will be no need for a federal truck tracking center 
because carriers who require tracking will be able to either do so 
themselves or contract with a private sector carrier who will track their 
trucks for them. 
D. BENEFITS TO THE GOVERNMENT  
TSA will also benefit in numerous ways from the STAR program.  Benefits 
include the following: 
• Risk-Based Security - A key factor in securing any industry against 
terrorism is to adopt random security measures.  Regulations are 
detrimental to security sometimes because they inform all people, 
including terrorists, about what security measures are in place and thus 
inherently about what security measures are not in place.  Also terrorists 
can learn the vulnerabilities and develop workarounds for mandated 
                                                 
188 David P. Gleason, Senior Director, Responsible Care, American Chemistry Council, interviewed 
by author, July 15, 2008. 
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security measures.  When individual carriers have to comply with 
individual risk-based security threat assessments, they will each develop 
security plans and install security devices unique to their needs.  This 
randomness has an effect much greater than just the security of STAR 
members.  It actually provides a broad net of security for all.  This is true 
because terrorists will be unsure of which companies are STAR members 
and even if they know that, they will not know which companies have 
installed which security devices.  This randomness puts too much risk into 
planning a terror attack and the terrorist will be encouraged to look 
elsewhere. 
• Broad Coverage - Because all hazmat carriers will be entitled to become 
members, the non-HSSM carriers will be brought into the security fold.  
While TSA may choose to pursue additional security requirements for 
HSSM carriers, all carriers will continue to benefit from membership. 
• Rapid Implementation - TSA maintains that it would like to eventually 
issue regulations for HSSM carriers.  This model is certainly workable, 
but due to the nature of the regulatory process, it is highly unlikely that 
any regulation will be issued soon.  The STAR program will require some 
setup time, but because it is voluntary, does not rely on government 
regulation or Congressional action, takes advantage of personnel and 
processes already in place, and the industry has expressed a desire to 
participate in such a program,189 it should be relatively easy to implement. 
• Metrics - Because members will be required to submit certifications of 
compliance, TSA will be able to track how many members they have and 
what types of security are being implemented.  Also, because carriers will 
be required to report security incidents, TSA can begin to collect data on 
such incidents that they can use to evaluate security programs, trends, and 
best practices. 
• Training - Since security training is a requirement under the program, TSA 
will be assured that the type of training it hoped to accomplish with the 
Highway Watch program is continuing.  TSA can verify this because 
completion of the training requirement will be certified by an independent 
certifier. 
• Public/Private Partnerships - Various aspects of the STAR program rely 
on partnerships.  The program will establish the need for partnerships with 
independent threat assessors and certifiers, certified trainers, and security 
equipment dealers and installers.   The state can also choose to use their 
inspectors as certifiers because this process can complement other state 
duties.  There will also be a need for a partnership with the insurance 
industry to develop the insurance requirements.  Additionally, the 
                                                 
189 Mike Lang, PMP Director, Responsible Distribution Process, National Association of Chemical 
Distributors, interviewed by author, June 25, 2008. 
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background check program will foster partnerships with state and federal 
agencies who work with hazmat driver’s license endorsements and the 
TWIC and the FAST programs.  Finally, the STAR security panel will 
require partnerships with federal, state, local, and tribal governments; 
hazmat carriers; and assorted members of industry.  All of these 
relationships help impress upon the industry its role as an active part of a 
national security program. 
• Public Confidence - TSA will gain public confidence in its security 
abilities when news of the expanded security coverage for all HSSM and 
non-HSSM carriers is announced.  Additionally, if a concerted effort is 
made to build the STAR brand, this will also serve well as a positive 
public face for TSA’s efforts. 
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X. POST-SOLUTION (THE DAY AFTER) 
It’s 9:15 am on black Friday, 2009.  Shoppers have been lined up at the malls 
since 7:30 am to take advantage of the special offers the retailers have advertised as 
incentives to encourage a full day of shopping.  The malls are crowded and the holiday 
season has been festive. 
It’s 9:15 am on black Friday, 2009.  Bud Wilson pulls his fuel tanker into a Shell 
station to make his first delivery for the day.  He parks his truck near the fuel tanks, takes 
his keys, gets out, and locks his door before he meets with the station manager to get his 
manifest signed. 
It’s 9:15 am on black Friday, 2009.  Adham has been waiting by the pay phone 
for Bud to arrive.  Bud always delivers on Friday and always on time.  Adham quietly 
walks over to the unattended fuel truck, tries the door, and finds it locked. 
Adham pulls his knife and approaches Bud demanding the keys to the truck.  A 
struggle ensues.  The station manager calls 9-1-1 to report the incident, but Bud is hurt, 
and Adham manages to get the keys, start the truck, and begins to drive off.  Fortunately, 
Bud’s company underwent a security threat assessment and installed remote panic 
buttons on their trucks in order to become a TSA STAR member.  Bud reaches for his 
transmitter and pushes the panic button. A signal is sent to his dispatcher and the engine 
of the truck slowly winds down.  The police are now just down the block and Adham 
cannot get the truck to restart.  He tries again and again, but the engine is dead.  Soon, a 
police officer is pulling him from the cab and wrestling him to the ground.  The same 
scenario is repeated in four other major American cities. 
Almost a month later on Christmas day, children all over America are smiling at 
the abundance of gifts under their trees.  Retailers all across the country are reporting 
record profits.  Life is good.  Things didn’t have to turn out this way, but the government 
knew of the threat and the government decided to act.  
 84
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 85
LIST OF REFERENCES 
American Chemistry Council. “Ensuring Accountability through Management System 
Certification.” http://reporting.responsiblecare-
us.com/reports/rcmsc_cmpny_rpt.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Performance through Responsible Care.” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_responsiblecare/doc.asp?CID=1298&DID=5
084 (accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Responsible Care.” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_responsiblecare/sec.asp?CID=1298&DID=4
841 (accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Responsible Care Security Code.” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_responsiblecare/doc.asp?CID=1298&DID=5
085 (accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Responsible Care Toolkit.” 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_rctoolkit/index.asp (accessed October 22, 
2008). 
Arrington, William. General Manager. TSA Highway and Motor Carrier Programs. 
Interview by author. Arlington, VA, July 27, 2007. 
Bloquist, Brian, and Tracy Connor. “Cops Nab Ten in Haz-mat Scheme.” The New York 
Post, September 27, 2001. 
Canada Border Services Agency. “Free and Secure Trade.” http://www.cbsa-
asfc.gc.ca/prog/fast-expres/menu-eng.html (accessed October 14, 2008). 
Chinni, Dante. “America's Roads May Be Just as Vulnerable as Its Skies.” The Christian 
Science Monitor, October 1, 2001. 
Clayton, Mark. “Hazardous-Materials Trucks: Terror Threat?” Christian Science 
Monitor, July 7, 2006. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0707/p02s01-usgn.html 
(accessed March 11, 2008). 
Decision Support System for a National HAZMAT Truck Tracking Center. 
Charlottesville, VA: The Accelerated Masters Program in Systems Engineering, 
2007. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Administration of the 
Federal Trucking Industry Security Grant Program for FY 2004 and FY 2005 
(October 29, 2007). 
 86
——. Fiscal Year 2008 Port Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit 
(February 2008). 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. “Fiscal Year 2008 Port Security Grant 
Program Guidance and Application Kit.” 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/psgp/fy08_psgp_guidance.pdf 
(accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “FY 2009 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP).” 
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/psgp/index.shtm (accessed October 14, 
2008). 
Gleason, David P. Senior Director, Responsible Care. American Chemistry Council. 
Interview by author. July 15, 2008. 
Hawley, Kip. Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration. Statement 
before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States 
Senate (January 18, 2007). 
——. Statement before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on 
Appropriations, United States House of Representatives. 
Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test Volume I: 
Evaluation Final Report Executive Summary. McLean, VA: SAIC, 2004. 
Lang, Mike. PMP Director. Responsible Distribution Process, National Association of 
Chemical Distributors. Interview by author. 
——. Interview by author, June 25, 2008. 
Loewenberg, Samuel. “Truckers Lose DHS Contract.” Politico, May 16, 2008. 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10412.html (accessed September 12, 
2008). 
National Association of Chemical Distributors. “Code of Management Practice.” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdpcode.aspx (accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Guiding Principles.” http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdpguide.aspx (accessed 
October 14, 2008). 
——. “Measuring the Impact of the Responsible Distribution Process on Environmental, 
Health, Safety, & Security Performance.” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdp_indices_members.aspx (accessed October 
14, 2008). 
 87
——. “RDP Compliance Timetable for NACD Candidates.” 
http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdp_compliance.aspx (accessed October 14, 
2008). 
——. “Responsible Distribution Process.” http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/ (accessed 
October 14, 2008). 
——. “Third Party Verification.” http://www.nacd.com/dist_process/rdpverification.aspx 
(accessed October 14, 2008). 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission 
Report. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. 
National Hazardous Material Commercial Vehicle Tracking System Study. 
Charlottesville, VA: Accelerated Solutions, 2006. 
National Park Service. “Historic Preservation Tax Incentives.” 
http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/tax/index.htm (accessed September 12, 2008). 
——. “Historic Preservation Tax Incentives.” 
http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/tps/tax/brochure1.htm (accessed October 14, 
2008). 
——. “Historic Preservation Certification Application.” 
http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/tax/hpcappl.htm (accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Incentives!” http://www.nps.gov/hps/tps/tax/incentives/index.htm (accessed 
October 14, 2008). 
President. “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.” 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (December 17, 2003). 
——. Executive Order 13416. “Strengthening Surface Transportation Security,” Federal 
Register 71, no. 235 (December 7, 2006): 71033. 
Report on FMCSA’s Security Sensitivity Visits to the House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations (January 31, 2002). 
Responsible Distribution Process Code Coordinator Manual 2008. Arlington, VA: 
National Association of Chemical Distributors, 2008. 
Roggio, Bill. “Another Chlorine Truck Bomb Found Near Ramadi.” The Long War 
Journal, March 27, 2007. 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/another_chlorine_tru.php 
(accessed March 18, 2008). 
Sammon, John. Letter to Highway and Motor Carrier Stakeholders, June 26, 2008. 
 88
Stock, D., et al. Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational 
Test Volume II: Evaluation Final Report Synthesis. Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. DOT, 2004. 
Transportation Security Administration Mission Statement. 
http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/mission.shtm (accessed December 11, 2008). 
Transportation Security Administration. “DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS 
TRIP).” http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/customer/redress/index.shtm (accessed 
October 22, 2008). 
——. “Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM) Security Action Items (SAIs).” 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highway/hssm_sai.shtm (accessed October 
22, 2008). 
——. “Programs.” http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highway/programs.shtm 
(accessed October 22, 2008). 
——. “Risk Management.” http://www.tsa.gov/approach/risk/index.shtm (accessed 
October 22, 2008). 
——. “Where We Stand.” http://www.tsa.gov/press/where_we_stand/training.shtm 
(accessed October 22, 2008). 
——. “Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC).” 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/twic/index.shtm (accessed April 2, 2008). 
——. “TSA Teams Up With American Trucking Associations to Prevent and Respond to 
Terrorism.” (March 23, 2004) 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/press_release_0405.shtm (accessed July 
29, 2008). 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership against 
Terrorism.” http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/ (accessed 
September 12, 2008). 
——. “FAST: Free and Secure Trade Program.” 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/fast/ (accessed October 
14, 2008). 
——. “What Is Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT)?” 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ (accessed 
October 14, 2008). 
U.S. Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency. “About Energy Star.” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_index (accessed October 14, 
2008). 
 89
——. “Energy Star.” http://www.energystar.gov/ (accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Energy Star Overview of 2007 Achievements.” 
http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/2007%20CPPD%204
pg.pdf (accessed October 22, 2008). 
——. “Energy Star Partners.” http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=news.nr_partners 
(accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Fall 2008 Energy Star News.” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=news.nr_fall2008 (accessed October 14, 
2008). 
——. “History of Energy Star.” 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_history (accessed July 23, 
2008). 
——. “Major Milestones.” http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_milestones 
(accessed October 14, 2008). 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “All About 
VPP.” http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/all_about_vpp.html (accessed October 14, 
2008). 
——. “Policies and Procedures.” http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/vpp_policy.html 
(accessed October 14, 2008). 
——. “Voluntary Protection Programs.” http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.html 
(accessed October 14, 2008). 
Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development. “Virginia Enterprise 
Zone Program.” 
http://www.dhcd.virginia.gov/CommunityDevelopmentRevitalization/Virginia_E
nterprise_Zones.htm (accessed October 14, 2008). 
Virginia Economic Development Partnership. “Virginia’s Enterprise Zone Program.” 
www.virginiaallies.org/pdf's/Articleonlocalenterprisezones.pdf (accessed 
September 12, 2008). 
White House, The. “United States – Canada Free and Secure Trade Program.” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020909-3.html (accessed 
October 14, 2008). 
 90
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
